Changes from v3 to v4 (comparison)

# Changes from version 3 to version 4: full comparison *Prepared October 28, 2026 for the Commission's October 29 meeting.* This note compares [[Draft Final Report v3|version 3]] with [[Draft Final Report v4|version 4]] paragraph by paragraph. ==Highlighted text== was added; ~~struck text~~ was deleted. Unchanged paragraphs are omitted. Sections are in version 4 order and use version 4 headings; text that moved appears as deleted in its old place and added in its new one. Revised and new figures are shown as they appear in version 4. Appendices A to G are new and are not repeated here. Appendices H to L were Appendices I to M in version 3. The summary list of changes is at the top of version 4. **Totals:** 174 paragraphs changed, 184 added, 20 deleted (excluding the new appendices). ## Final Report of the Commission to Study Stable Tokens, Tokenized Real-World Assets, and Blockchain-based Trusts Frameworks **Changed heading:** Final Report of the Commission to Study Stable Tokens, Tokenized Real-World Assets, and Blockchain-based Trusts ==Frameworks== **Changed:** Previous version: ~~[[Draft Final Report v2]] | Next version: [[Draft Final Report v4]]~~ ==[[Draft Final Report v3|Version 3]]== **Added:** > [!note] ==Draft for adoption== > ==This is the draft the Commission will consider at its October 29, 2026 meeting. It has not been adopted. Each motion proposed for a vote is numbered (Motions 1 to 15, in §9.3 and §12) so the roll call can refer to it; the adoption record and the letter of transmittal will be completed after the vote.== **Added:** the "Changes from version 3" summary list at the top of version 4. ## Letter of transmittal **Added:** ==*Draft, for signature after the Commission votes on adoption.*== **Deleted:** ~~*To be added after adoption.* The report will be transmitted to the Governor, the Speaker of the House, the President of the Senate, the State Librarian, and the House and Senate commerce committees.~~ **Added:** ==October 30, 2026== ==To: the Speaker of the House of Representatives; the President of the Senate; the House Commerce and Consumer Affairs Committee; the Senate Commerce Committee; the House Clerk; the Senate Clerk; the Governor; and the State Library== ==Pursuant to RSA 383:26, IV, I transmit the final report of the Commission to Study Stable Tokens, Tokenized Real-World Assets, and Blockchain-based Trusts Frameworks, as adopted by the Commission on October 29, 2026. In fourteen public meetings since September 2025, the Commission heard from regulators, banks, issuers, technologists, scholars, and members of the public. The report describes the Commission's activities, states its findings, and sets out its recommendations for legislation and agency action, including a state framework that New Hampshire can submit for federal certification under the GENIUS Act. The Commission's record, numbered R-1 to R-51, accompanies the report as Volume 2. I thank the members, the presenters, the state agencies that hosted and supported our work, and the members of the public who followed it closely.== ==Respectfully submitted,== ==Rep. Keith Ammon, Chair== ## Adoption record **Added:** ==*To be completed at the October 29, 2026 meeting. If any member participates remotely, at least one-third of the members must be present in the room and all votes must be by roll call (RSA 91-A:2, IV(b)); a quorum is five members (RSA 383:26, III).*== **Deleted:** ~~*To be added after adoption.*~~ **Added:** | ==Member== | ==Present (in person / remote) or absent== | ==Vote on adoption== | |---|---|---| | ==Rep. Keith Ammon, Chair== | | | | ==Rep. Jim Kofalt, Vice Chair== | | | | ==Rep. Chris McAleer== | | | | ==Sen. Tara Reardon== | | | | ==Sen. Daryl Abbas== | | | | ==Michael Moranti (Banking Commissioner's designee)== | | | | ==Brandon Garod (Attorney General's designee)== | | | | ==Katie Taylor (Secretary of State's designee)== | | | | ==Jim Kisch== | | | | ==Andy Schwab== | | | | ==Dan Nuñez Cohen== | | | | ==Prof. Seth Oranburg== | | | | ==Motion== | ==Subject== | ==Result (in favor / opposed / abstaining)== | |---|---|---| | ==1== | ==Recommendation 1: certifiable state issuer framework== | | | ==2== | ==Recommendation 2: protections beyond the federal floor== | | | ==3== | ==Recommendation 3: rules for monitoring, freezing, and reversing tokens== | | | ==4== | ==Recommendation 4: tokenized deposits== | | | ==5== | ==Recommendation 5: safe harbor and binding answers for builders== | | | ==6== | ==Recommendation 6: Office of Financial Innovation (Bill D)== | | | ==7== | ==Recommendation 7: supervisory structure and federal partnerships== | | | ==8== | ==Recommendation 8: tokenized real-world assets (Bill B)== | | | ==9== | ==Recommendation 9: privacy in digital money (Bill C)== | | | ==10== | ==Recommendation 10: one body to carry the work forward== | | | ==11== | ==Recommendation 11: federal engagement and interstate cooperation== | | | ==12== | ==Recommendation 12: blockchain-based trusts redraft== | | | ==13== | ==Recommendation 13: further study== | | | ==14== | ==§9.3: Commission position on blockchain-based trusts== | | | ==15== | ==§12.6: no-statute baseline not adopted== | | | ==Final== | ==Motion to adopt the report and its findings and recommendations, as amended== | | ==*Decisions on contested items, taken before the motions above (October 29 agenda, Section IV):*== | ==Vote== | ==Question== | ==Result (in favor / opposed / abstaining)== | |---|---|---| | ==Minutes== | ==Approval of the October 15, 2026 minutes, as corrected== | | | ==Minutes== | ==Correction of the approved February 10, 2026 minutes (Appendix C)== | | | ==A== | ==Recommendation 5: refer narrowing the RSA 399-G:3, VII exemption to study== | | | ==B== | ==Recommendation 8: change-of-control threshold for the transfer tax, or study only== | | | ==C== | ==Recommendation 13: keep or drop the study of tokenized money market fund shares and the Public Deposit Investment Pool== | | | ==D1== | ==Delete the statements on the Banking Department's funding model and supervision (§4.4, §6, Finding 6, §11.1)== | | | ==D2== | ==If D1 fails: restate them without attribution== | | | ==E1== | ==§11.2: delete the $1 billion sentence== | | | ==E2== | ==§11.2: replace "unsupervised"== | | | ==F1== | ==§4.1: delete the "What would be lost" and FedNow sentences and the "What could go wrong" box== | | | ==F2== | ==§6: delete the tokenized real-world assets row== | | | ==G1== | ==§4.4: add the CEA and Federal Reserve analyses== | | | ==G2== | ==Take a position on affiliate yield or the CLARITY Act (not put unless a member moves it)== | | | ==H== | ==§2.5: drop the remaining non-government outside sources== | | | ==I1== | ==Open question (Rec 13): a right to keep property records and deposits non-tokenized (Parker Feld)== | | | ==I2== | ==Open question (Rec 13): requiring businesses to accept cash (Parker Feld)== | | | ==I3== | ==Open question (Rec 13): tokenizing natural assets (Parker Feld)== | | ==Members absent: ________.== ==Statements for the appendices: departments (Appendix F): ________; members (Appendix G): ________. If none: appendix removed and later appendices relettered / kept with "None submitted" (circle one).== ## Disclaimer **Added:** ==This report is advisory. The Commission was established to study and report (RSA 383:26). Its findings and recommendations change no law and bind no one: not the General Court, the Governor, or any state agency. A recommendation takes effect only if the General Court enacts it or an agency acts under its own authority.== **Changed:** The findings and recommendations in this report are those of the Commission. They do not necessarily reflect the views of any member's employer, agency, or appointing authority. Members served in their individual capacities as Commission members, not as representatives of their employers, agencies, or companies. State departments may state their own positions in Appendix ~~G,~~ ==F,== and members may add statements in Appendix ~~H.~~ ==G.== ## Members of the Commission **Changed:** | Member | Seat under RSA 383:26, II | | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------ | | Rep. Keith Ammon, Chair (Hillsborough 42) | House member, appointed by the Speaker | | Rep. Jim Kofalt, Vice Chair (Hillsborough 32) | House member, appointed by the Speaker | | Rep. Chris McAleer (Carroll 2) | House member, appointed by the Speaker | | Sen. Tara Reardon (District 15) | Senate member, appointed by the Senate President | | Sen. Daryl Abbas (District 22) | Senate member, appointed by the Senate President | | Michael Moranti, Deputy Commissioner of Banking | Banking Commissioner's designee | | Brandon Garod, Senior Assistant Attorney General | Attorney General's designee | | Katie Taylor, Staff Attorney, Bureau of Securities Regulation | Secretary of State's designee | | Jim Kisch, President and CEO, Passumpsic Bank | New Hampshire banking industry representative | | Andy Schwab | Blockchain industry representative | | Dan Nuñez Cohen, Head of Policy, Crypto.com | Blockchain industry representative | | Prof. Seth Oranburg, ~~UNH~~ ==The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law (formerly== Franklin Pierce School of ~~Law~~ ==Law, UNH)== | Academic member | ## In brief *(new section)* **Deleted:** ~~Under the GENIUS Act (July 18, 2025), a state may supervise stablecoin issuers with up to $10 billion in circulation if its regime is certified as "substantially similar," and an issuer licensed by a certified state may operate nationwide (§4.1). State submissions are initially due January 18, 2028 (Conference of State Bank Supervisors, or CSBS, March 10). After twelve public meetings, the Commission recommends three bills for 2027, aimed at that deadline.~~ **Added:** ==Money is starting to move on blockchains, and federal law now lets each state decide whether to license and supervise part of that business itself. The Commission recommends that New Hampshire do so: build a licensing framework for stablecoin issuers that can be submitted for federal certification by January 18, 2028; add consumer and privacy protections that federal law does not require; remove a tax obstacle to tokenized real estate; and keep studying the questions the record could not answer. It proposes four bills for the 2027 session (Bills A to D, below). Terms are defined in the glossary (Appendix D).== ## What the Commission studied *(new section)* **Added:** ==The Legislature asked the Commission (RSA 383:26; Appendix A) to study three subjects:== - ==**Stable tokens, or stablecoins.** A stablecoin is a digital token built to hold a steady value, usually one U.S. dollar, so that it can be used as money on a blockchain, a shared digital ledger that records who holds what. Most are issued by private companies that hold cash and short-term U.S. Treasury securities behind each token. More than $300 billion were in circulation in 2026 (§3.2). Products that look alike can be legally very different: a stablecoin, a bank deposit recorded on a blockchain (a tokenized deposit), and a money market fund share recorded on a blockchain have different issuers, regulators, and rights for the holder (§3.1).== - ==**Tokenized real-world assets.** A token can also represent ownership of something that exists off the blockchain, such as real estate, Treasury bonds, or a share in a fund. Tokenizing an asset can let it be divided into small pieces and traded at any hour, but the law that governs the underlying asset still applies (§8.3).== - ==**Blockchain-based trusts.** A proposal to recognize asset protection trusts whose terms are carried out by a computer program on a blockchain (a smart contract) that no person can change, so that no trustee could be ordered to hand the assets over (§9).== ## Why now *(new section)* **Added:** ==Until July 2025 the United States had no federal stablecoin law. The GENIUS Act, signed July 18, 2025, requires stablecoins to be fully backed by reserves, bars issuers from paying interest to holders, and requires issuers to be able to freeze tokens on lawful order (§3.3, §4.1, §4.2). It also gives states a choice. A state may license and supervise issuers with up to $10 billion in circulation if its rules are certified as "substantially similar" to the federal standard, and an issuer licensed by a certified state may operate nationwide (§4.1). State submissions are initially due January 18, 2028 (Conference of State Bank Supervisors, or CSBS, March 10). If New Hampshire builds nothing, its companies can still use the federal path, but the state would offer no licensing home for smaller issuers, and residents would keep using stablecoins supervised under other jurisdictions' rules (§4.1, §11.4).== ## What the Commission did *(new section)* **Added:** ==The Commission held fourteen public meetings in Concord between September 2025 and October 2026. It heard from state regulators and their national association, community and national banks, stablecoin issuers, technology firms, scholars, and members of the public; each presentation is summarized in Appendix B and the minutes are in Appendix C. Most presenters had a commercial interest in the subject (Appendix L), and no independent economist, consumer advocate, or federal supervisor testified, so the report notes each presenter's interest and recommends study where the record is thin (§2.5).== ## What the Commission concluded *(new section)* **Changed:** **New Hampshire should act now, and it should aim to lead.** It will not be first: Wyoming already issues its own token, and other states have enacted stablecoin laws (§5.1). It cannot lead by being looser, because federal certification requires state rules at least as protective as federal ones (§4.1). It can lead by building on what it has: a constitutional right to live free from governmental intrusion in private information (Article 2-b); a money transmitter exemption for convertible virtual currency; a commercial code that governs controllable electronic records and excludes government electronic currency from money; a DAO law, ==authority for== a blockchain dispute docket, and protections for self-custody, node operation, ~~mining,~~ and staking; a trust industry that has drawn firms from out of state; and a state bankers association that has joined a bank-owned payments network in development (§5.2). **Added:** ==The record identified three main risks, and the recommendations answer each:== - ==**Deposits leaving community banks.** Dollars moved from local banks into stablecoins could reduce local lending. The estimates come from interested parties and rest on different assumptions: up to about $1.7 billion (the American Bankers Association's estimate, revised after the record closed from about $1.9 billion) and about $5 billion under one vendor's scenario (§4.4). Recommendation 4 confirms that tokenized deposits are deposits, so banks can offer blockchain-based payments while the dollars stay on deposit (§5.2).== - ==**Privacy and control.** Federal law requires issuers to be able to freeze tokens, and whoever holds a token's control keys can change outcomes (§4.1, §7.2, §7.4). Article 2-b of the New Hampshire Constitution protects the right to live free from governmental intrusion in private information. Recommendations 3 and 9 set rules for when a token may be frozen and when the state may see records.== - ==**Consumers.** Most retail holders cannot redeem a stablecoin directly with its issuer; they sell it on markets that can fail under stress (§3.1, §7.1). Recommendation 2 would require New Hampshire-licensed issuers to let every holder redeem at par.== ==**What the Commission does not recommend.** It does not recommend that New Hampshire issue its own token now, as Wyoming does; it recommends study first (Recommendation 13). Nor does it recommend a state bank; relying on tokenized deposits alone, with no issuer statute (Motion 15); a new licensing law for tokenized real-world assets, since those in the record are securities or LLC interests that existing law already covers; or enactment of the blockchain-based trusts draft as written, which should be redrafted for 2028 (Recommendation 12) (§12.6, §12.7). It takes no position on markets in tokenized securities, which it did not study (§2.5).== ==After twelve meetings of testimony and two to review and adopt this report, the Commission recommends four bills for 2027, aimed at the January 18, 2028 federal deadline.== ## Four bills for 2027 **Changed heading:** ~~Three~~ ==Four== bills for 2027 **Changed:** | Bill | What it does | Recommendations | ~~Committees~~ ==Possible committees== | | ------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | | A. Certification and consumer trust | A certifiable stablecoin issuer framework with protections beyond the federal floor, including limits on which stablecoins service providers may offer residents, clear rules for freezes and recalls, tokenized deposits, ==and== a safe harbor for builders (software developers and other innovators, defined in Recommendation ~~5), and an independent Office of Financial Innovation~~ ==5)== | 1 to ==5,== 7 | House Commerce and Consumer Affairs; Senate Commerce | | B. Tokenized real-world assets | A change-of-control test for the real estate transfer tax, on-chain ownership registers, securities guidance, and a voluntary safe harbor for verifiable tokens ~~(proof of reserves,~~ ==(proof-of-reserves,== independent attestation, and contract audits) | 8 | House Ways and Means and Commerce and Consumer Affairs; Senate Ways and Means and Commerce | | C. Privacy in digital money | Extends the Right to Privacy Act to digital money, sets the showing for state access and freezes, limits state use of a retail central bank digital currency (CBDC), and guarantees payment choice | 9 | House and Senate Judiciary | | ==D. Office of Financial Innovation== | ==An independent, advisory Office of Financial Innovation, the state's single point of contact for digital finance, with no licensing or supervisory power== | ==6== | ==To be determined== | ==Passing== Bill A ~~must pass~~ in 2027 ~~for~~ ==is== ~~New~~ ==preferable:== ~~Hampshire~~ ==a== ~~to~~ ==conditional== ~~certify~~ ==certification== ~~on~~ ==filed== ~~time;~~ ==by January 18, 2028 meets the federal deadline, but federal review begins only when the filing is complete (§4.1).== Bills ~~B~~ ==B, C,== and ~~C~~ ==D== stand on their own and cannot delay it. Recommendations 10, 12, and 13 run through LSR 2027-0239 (§3.4) or a successor body, and Recommendation 11 is agency action. Appendix ~~K~~ ==J== maps each bill. ~~Members asked on October 15 whether the~~ ==The== Office of Financial Innovation (Recommendation 6) ~~should~~ ==is== ~~be~~ ==proposed as== its own ~~bill;~~ ==bill, Bill D, so that== it ~~appears~~ ==does== ~~in~~ ==not== ~~Bill~~ ==ride== ~~A pending~~ ==on== the ~~Commission's~~ ==certification== ~~decision.~~ ==bill; the Banking Department's filed framework (LSR 2027-0200) does not include it. Committees are listed only as possibilities; referral is for the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate.== The report does not address markets in tokenized securities (§2.5). ## Findings **Changed:** 1. **Federal law now sets the terms for state action.** 2. **The market is large and growing, though measured inconsistently.** 3. **Tokens that look alike are legally different.** 4. **States are moving, along several models.** 5. **Bank-led designs can keep deposits local.** 6. **Deposit flight is the most-cited risk, and its size is uncertain.** 7. **A state token could compete with community banks for deposits; bank-led designs show how the two can work together.** 8. **Retail holders depend on markets, not redemption.** 9. **Privacy is a design choice, and New Hampshire's Constitution speaks to it.** 10. **Whoever holds the keys controls the token.** 11. **Tokenized real-world assets fit existing law, and New Hampshire can be a home for them.** 12. **Blockchain-based trusts are novel and promising, and the proposal needs refinement.** 13. **New Hampshire has foundations to build on: blockchain statutes, a trust industry, and UNH talent.** 14. **Some questions were not ~~answered.**~~ ==answered,** including algorithmic stablecoins, oracle liability, and markets in tokenized securities.== 15. **Network effects reward scale and connection.** ## Recommendations **Changed:** All recommendations are proposed for Commission vote. Each is explained in ~~§12.~~ ==§12, where Motions 1 to 13 state them for the vote.== | No. | Recommendation | Vehicle | |---|---|---| | 1 | Enact a state stablecoin issuer framework built for federal certification on ~~time, open to New Hampshire trust companies, with fast, funded licensing~~ ==time== | Bill A | | 2 | Go beyond the federal floor: redemption at par for every holder, reserve safety, plain disclosure with a compliance mark, limits on which stablecoins service providers may offer residents, and a privacy floor for issuers | Bill A | | 3 | Set clear statutory rules for when a token may be monitored, frozen, or reversed | Bill A | | 4 | Confirm ==by guidance== that tokenized deposits are deposits, and guide banks joining shared networks | Bill A | | 5 | Give builders a safe harbor and binding answers within 60 days | Bill A | | 6 | Establish an independent Office of Financial Innovation | Bill ~~A~~ ==D== | | 7 | Name the Banking Department as regulator and authorize the federal partnerships certification needs | Bill A | | 8 | Make New Hampshire a home for tokenized real-world assets: a change-of-control transfer tax, on-chain ownership registers, securities guidance, and a voluntary safe harbor for verifiable tokens | Bill B | | 9 | Extend the Right to Privacy Act to digital money, require a warrant or court order for state access and freezes, limit a retail CBDC, and guarantee payment choice | Bill C | | 10 | Give one body the work after RSA 383:26's repeal | LSR 2027-0239 or session law | | 11 | Engage on federal rules and explore interstate cooperation | Agency action | | 12 | Redraft the blockchain-based trusts proposal for the 2028 session | Legislation, after review | | 13 | Study a state token, a tokenized municipal bond pilot, and open questions | Further study | ## 2.3 Meetings **Changed:** The Commission met twelve times in public in Concord, at 1 Granite Place and at the New Hampshire Banking Department, 53 Regional Drive, from September 17, 2025 to September 17, 2026. Several meetings offered Microsoft Teams access; the public attended, asked questions, and once presented. The Commission met on October 15, 2026 to review this report in draft, with five members present, and on October 29, 2026 ==at the State House== to adopt ~~it.~~ ==it, for fourteen meetings in all.== Appendix ~~J~~ ==I== lists each meeting's date, presenters, and topics. ## 2.4 Public record **Added:** ==During the Commission's work, agendas, materials, video, and minutes were posted on an informal, unofficial information portal, which will not be maintained after November 1, 2026. The Commission's record, numbered R-1 to R-51 and listed in Appendix E, is transmitted with this report as Volume 2 to each recipient under RSA 383:26, IV, including the State Library. The General Court lists the Commission at gc.nh.gov/statstudcomm/details.aspx?id=1729. Teams did not capture the May 4, 2026 video; a lower-resolution video and a transcript are posted, and the minutes were prepared from the transcript. No recording or transcript exists of the August 19, 2026 meeting; its minutes were reconstructed from the agenda, presenters' materials, and the Chair's information. Appendix B summarizes each presentation; Appendix C holds the minutes. Drafts of the minutes and of this report were prepared with the help of AI tools under the Chair's direction, from the meeting videos and transcripts; the Commission is responsible for the text it adopts.== **Deleted:** ~~Agendas, materials, video, and minutes are on the Commission's public portal. Teams did not capture the May 4, 2026 video; a lower-resolution video and a transcript are posted, and the minutes were prepared from the transcript. No recording or transcript exists of the August 19, 2026 meeting; its minutes were reconstructed from the agenda, presenters' materials, and the Chair's information, and the report gives it less weight. Appendix B summarizes each presentation; Appendix C holds the minutes.~~ ## 2.5 How to read this report **Changed:** Figures carry their source and date. ~~Facts~~ ==Legal authorities (constitutional provisions, statutes, session laws, bills, federal rules and agency orders and guidance, executive orders, and court decisions) are cited directly, whether or not a presenter cited them; rules and orders issued after the record closed carry their dates. Other facts== from outside the ~~record~~ ==record, such as later events, market data, and news reports,== appear only where needed to keep the report accurate and current, each marked **[Outside the record]** with its source. ==A marked fact repeated elsewhere refers back to the section where it is marked. Presenters' statements are cited by name and meeting date; the minutes and materials for each meeting are listed by record number in Appendix E and reproduced in Volume 2.== Each section opens by naming the part of RSA 383:26 it answers. Dates without a year are 2026. Terms are defined in Appendix D; token types are compared in §3.1. The record runs through the Commission's October 15, 2026 meeting; later events ==and rules== appear only where accuracy requires, ~~labeled~~ ==dated== ~~outside~~ ==or== ~~the~~ ==marked== ~~record.~~ ==as above.== **Limits of the record.** Most presenters were companies or trade groups with a stake in the outcome; Appendix ~~M~~ ==L== lists their interests. No independent economist, consumer advocate, or federal supervisor testified, and the most sustained skeptical presentation came from a member of the public (Parker Feld, May 4). The report therefore cites federal law to the statute where it matters, notes each presenter's interest, and recommends study where the record is thin. **Tokenized securities.** The Commission took no evidence on markets in tokenized securities, such as tokenized stocks and the venues that trade them, and makes no recommendation on ~~them~~ ==them.== ~~(Oranburg, October 15). [Outside the record: on~~ ==On== September 17, 2026, the SEC ~~granted~~ ==issued== a ==five-year order granting== temporary, conditional ~~exemption,~~ ==exemptive relief,== the "Innovation Exemption," ~~allowing~~ ==to== ~~limited~~ ==qualifying Tokenized Securities Venues from the definition of "exchange" under Exchange Act section 3(a)(1), and to qualifying liquidity providers from the definition of "dealer" under section 3(a)(5), for== on-chain trading of tokenized NMS ~~stocks~~ ==stock,== ~~on~~ ==expiring== ~~Tokenized~~ ==September== ~~Securities~~ ==17,== ~~Venues~~ ==2031== (SEC Release ~~2026-90).]~~ ==No. 34-106402; 91 FR 60168, September 22, 2026). The relief is narrow: it does not create a general exemption for tokenized securities, permit primary offerings through such a venue, or displace Securities Act registration requirements.== Where a tokenized real-world asset is itself a security, such as a fund share or an LLC interest, existing securities law applies (§8.3), and the Bureau of Securities Regulation, not the Banking Department, is its regulator (Recommendation 7). Further work on tokenized securities is ~~left~~ ==one== ~~to~~ ==of the open questions in Recommendation 13, for== the body under Recommendation ~~10 (Recommendation 13).~~ ==10.== ## 2.6 Relationship to the 2022 Commission **Changed:** The 2022 Commission on Cryptocurrencies and Digital Assets (Executive Order 2022-1, chaired by William Ardinger) reported on December 21, 2022 with three findings and twelve recommendations. The Chair and Andy Schwab served on ~~both.~~ ==both, and the Banking Department and the Attorney General's office held seats on both (Executive Order 2022-1, paragraph 2).== Presenters built on its work: Ian Huyett's ~~proposed~~ ==proposals included a blockchain== dispute ~~docket~~ ==docket,== ~~drew~~ ==building== on a 2022 recommendation (November 12, 2025), and UNH is building the Secretary of State's DAO registry (Chair, September 17, 2026). Two 2022 recommendations have since become ~~law.~~ ==law== ~~[Outside~~ ==(2024,== ~~the~~ ==263;== ~~record:~~ ==2026,== ~~General Court bill dockets.]~~ ==286:4).== The same 2026 act, the Blockchain Basic Laws (RSA 359-V), protects self-custody (RSA ~~359-V:2)~~ ==359-V:2); protects node operation, transfers, and staking from state or local prohibition; exempts both mining== and node ~~operation,~~ ==operation== ~~mining,~~ ==from money transmitter licensing;== and ==provides that mining or== staking ==with one's own assets is not a securities offering== (RSA 359-V:3). **The BFA Bitcoin-backed bond.** On May 13 the Chair reported that the Business Finance Authority was preparing what would be the first state-level conduit bond collateralized by Bitcoin, about $100 million, with collateral from the miner CleanSpark. ~~[Outside the record: Boston Globe; Bloomberg]~~ The Executive Council rejected it 3 to 2 on July 8, ~~2026.~~ ==2026 [Outside the record: The Block; The Bond Buyer].== It is not pending. Members asked that it be noted here, with the 2022 Commission's legacy, as part of New Hampshire's record of engagement with digital finance (October 15). ## 3. The landscape today **Changed:** When the 2022 Commission reported, the United States had no federal stablecoin law. The GENIUS Act, signed July 18, 2025, is the first (Chair's year in review, May 4). While this Commission met, the dollar-token market grew (§3.2), Wyoming put the first state-issued stable token into production, and four federal agencies began writing the rules that will decide what a state may ~~do.~~ ==do (Figure 1).== **Figure revised.** The version 4 figure: ```mermaid --- config: flowchart: nodeSpacing: 20 rankSpacing: 10 wrappingWidth: 360 --- flowchart TD a["Dec 2022 2022 Commission reports December 21"] --> b["Jul 2025 HB 310 signed July 15, creating this Commission; GENIUS Act signed July 18"] b --> c["Sep 2025 to Sep 2026 Twelve meetings of testimony"] c --> d["Jan 2026 Wyoming FRNT public launch January 7"] d --> e["Sep 2026 Treasury certification rule September 30"] e --> e2["Oct 2026 Draft review October 15; adoption October 29"] e2 --> f["Nov 2026 Commission report due November 1"] f --> g["Jan 2027 GENIUS Act effective January 18"] g --> h["Jan 2028 State framework deadline January 18, per CSBS"] ``` **Changed:** *Figure 1. Key dates. ~~[Outside the record:~~ ==Sources:== HB 310 ~~signing~~ ==(2025,== ~~date~~ ==177),== ~~(July~~ ==signed July== 15, ~~2025, General Court docket); FRNT public launch date (Franklin Templeton release);~~ ==2025;== Treasury interim final rule (91 FR 61688); GENIUS ~~effective~~ ==Act== ~~date~~ ==section== ~~(earlier~~ ==20== ~~of~~ ==(effective date:== January 18, ~~2027~~ ==2027,== ~~or~~ ==since no primary regulator issued final rules more than== 120 days ~~after~~ ==earlier).== ~~final~~ ==[Outside== ~~rules,~~ ==the== ~~per~~ ==record:== ~~Chapman~~ ==FRNT== ~~tracker).]~~ ==public launch, January 7, 2026 (Kraken; Wyoming Public Media).]== The January 18, 2028 date is from CSBS (March 10).* ## 3.1 Four tokens that look alike **Changed:** A **stable token** is a digital token built to hold a steady value, usually one U.S. dollar, so it can be used as money on a blockchain. Very different products are "commonly marketed under the 'stablecoin' label" (BitGo's Eugene Hahr, March 10). The record supports a family tree based on who stands behind the ~~token.~~ ==token (Figure 2).== **Figure revised.** The version 4 figure: ```mermaid --- config: flowchart: nodeSpacing: 14 rankSpacing: 40 wrappingWidth: 380 --- flowchart LR root["Dollar-like tokens"] --> ps["Payment stablecoin Issuer holds 1:1 reserves and must redeem at par. Examples: USDC (Circle), USDT (Tether), FIUSD (Fiserv). Related: Wyoming's state-issued FRNT, which Wyoming argues falls outside GENIUS"] root --> tdep["Tokenized deposit A bank deposit recorded on a blockchain. Examples: JPM Coin, Hazel network (Vantage and Custodia), Fiserv multi-bank tokenized deposit"] root --> mmf["Tokenized money market fund share A share in a registered fund, a security that can pay yield. Examples: Ceres Coin, Lynq settlement shares, BlackRock BUIDL, Franklin Templeton BENJI"] root --> wrap["Wrapped token A token standing in for an asset held elsewhere. Example: WBTC, Bitcoin wrapped on Ethereum (BitGo)"] ``` **Changed:** *Figure 2. The family of dollar-like tokens in the Commission's record (Circle, August 19; Canton, February 10; Vantage, May 13; Fiserv, September 17; Ceres, January 14; Lynq, May 13; Chair, May 4; BitGo, March ~~10).~~ ==10; Digital Chamber, November 12, 2025).== Wrapped tokens can represent any asset, not only dollars.* **New figure:** ```mermaid --- config: flowchart: nodeSpacing: 20 rankSpacing: 20 wrappingWidth: 320 --- flowchart TD d["Primary market Institutions send dollars to the issuer"] --> r["Reserves: cash and high-quality liquid assets"] r --> m["Issuer mints tokens 1:1"] m --> ex["Secondary market Exchanges and wallets: payments, trading, DeFi"] ex --> arb["If the price falls below $1, market makers buy tokens"] arb --> back["Primary market Tokens returned to the issuer, which burns them and pays $1 each"] ``` **Removed:** a version 3 figure. **Added:** ==**The technology varies too.** Blockchains differ in who may read them and who may run them. Anyone can read a public ledger; on a permissioned ledger, only approved parties validate transactions. The two can be combined: Hedera runs a public ledger whose validators are permissioned, so "public versus permissioned" is a false binary (December 10, 2025). Tokens also need to move between blockchains (interoperability), and the designs differ in whom the user must trust along the way. LayerZero destroys ("burns") a token on one chain and creates ("mints") it natively on the other, and cited about $2.1 billion in industry losses from "bridges" that instead lock the original and issue a wrapped copy (April 6); Hazel switches the entity that backs the token when it leaves the bank network (May 13); and Fiserv burns one form of token and issues another (September 17). Custody, meaning who holds the keys that control a token, also varies: a person may hold their own keys (self-custody), a trust bank may hold them, or several parties may each hold a share so that no one can act alone (multi-party signing) (Schwab, September 17; Anchorage, January 14). Holding the cash reserves behind a token is a different job from holding the tokens themselves (Healey, September 17). Freeze and blacklist controls sit in the token's contract, not in the blockchain (§7.1), so whoever holds those keys can change outcomes; Wyoming required that it own its contracts and keys outright (LayerZero, April 6). Kisch observed that the variety reflects design around specific purposes rather than a Wild West: the networks the Commission heard are highly organized, relatively mature, and carry substantial volume, and their differences are tools fitted to different uses (October 15).== **Deleted:** ~~**The technology varies too.** "Public versus permissioned" is a false binary: Hedera runs a public ledger with permissioned validators (December 10, 2025). Interoperability rests on different trust models: LayerZero mints and burns natively across chains, citing about $2.1 billion in industry losses from wrapped-token bridges (April 6); Hazel switches the backing entity (May 13); Fiserv burns one form and issues another (September 17). Self-custody, trust-bank custody, and multi-party signing differ (Schwab, September 17; Anchorage, January 14), and custody of cash reserves is not custody of tokens (Healey, September 17). Freeze and blacklist controls sit in the token contract, not the chain (§7.1), so whoever holds the keys can change outcomes; Wyoming required that it own its contracts and keys outright (LayerZero, April 6). The variety reflects design for different purposes, not disorder: the networks the Commission heard are organized, relatively mature, and carry substantial volume (Kisch, October 15).~~ ## 3.2 The market, dated **Changed:** | Stablecoin supply | Source | Date | |---|---|---| | About $240 billion | Chair's year in review (twelve-month start point) | About May 2025, reported May 4, 2026 | | About $300 billion | Fortris | December 10, 2025 | | About $316 billion | Chainlink | April 6, 2026 | | About $322 billion | Chair's year in review (end point) | May 4, 2026 | | About $313 billion | [Outside the record: CoinDesk ~~Research]~~ ==Research, September 2026 report]== | End of September 2026 | *Table 3.2. Stablecoin supply as cited to the Commission, by date. Sources measured differently, so the figures are not a single series. ~~The Digital Chamber's $170 billion (November 12, 2025) is omitted as out of date.~~ None of these totals separates tokens that will comply with the GENIUS Act from those, such as some foreign-issued tokens, that may not (October 15).* ## 3.3 The federal picture **Changed:** The GENIUS Act requires 100% reserves, creates three types of issuer, gives holders priority in failure, and preserves a state pathway (Chair, May 4). Its rules were still being written throughout the Commission's work, and the companion CLARITY ~~Act~~ ==Act, a market-structure bill intended to give digital asset markets a comprehensive federal framework,== was not enacted (§4.1; Appendix ~~L).~~ ==K).== ## 3.4 New Hampshire today **Changed:** New Hampshire has no stablecoin statute. The Secretary of State's DAO registry is to accept USDC or Tether for registration fees, which the Chair called New Hampshire's "first foray into accepting digital assets at the state level" (December 10, 2025). StoneCastle Trust Company, a New Hampshire trust company acquired by Fiserv, holds cash reserves for Fiserv's token products (Healey, September 17). The Business Finance Authority's Bitcoin-collateralized bond is covered in §2.6. ~~[Outside the record:~~ LSR 2027-0200, "regulating the use of stablecoins," prime sponsor Rep. John Hunt, has been filed for 2027; text ==is== not yet available. Also filed: LSR 2027-0239, a task force to study emerging technologies and digital innovations in blockchain, cryptocurrency, artificial intelligence, and cybersecurity, prime sponsor Rep. John Schneller (General Court LSR ~~search).]~~ ==search).== ## 4.1 The legal framework: federal certification is the gate **Changed:** Under the GENIUS Act, licensed nonbanks may issue payment stablecoins directly; banks only through a "firewalled" subsidiary. Issuers above $10 billion in circulation face enhanced federal supervision; smaller issuers may stay under state regulation (Circle, August 19). A state may supervise these "state qualified" issuers only if its regime is certified as "substantially similar" to the federal ~~standard.~~ ==standard (Figure 4).== **Deleted:** ~~**What certification buys.** [Outside the record: GENIUS Act sections 4(c)(3), 4(d), and 7(f).] An issuer licensed by a certified state needs no license from any other state, so a New Hampshire license would work nationwide; host states' consumer protection laws still apply. An issuer that grows past $10 billion moves to joint state and federal supervision but is not required to convert to a federal charter.~~ **Added:** ==**What certification buys.** An issuer licensed by a certified state needs no license from any other state, so a New Hampshire license would work nationwide; host states' consumer protection laws still apply. An issuer that grows past $10 billion moves to joint state and federal supervision but is not required to convert to a federal charter (GENIUS Act sections 4(c)(3), 4(d), and 7(f); Appendix K).== **Changed:** **Timing.** ~~CSBS~~ ==The Conference of State Bank Supervisors (CSBS), an association of state bank regulators,== told the Commission that January 18, 2028 is the initial deadline for states to submit frameworks (March ~~10). [Outside the record:~~ ==10;== GENIUS Act sections 4(c)(4), 4(c)(7), and ~~20.]~~ ==20).== That is the latest it can fall, and New Hampshire will not qualify for expedited review. The realistic path has two tracks: a conditional filing as soon as Treasury accepts filings, and a complete filing once rules are adopted. Recommendation 1 would have the act take effect on passage, with interim rules adopting the federal standards by reference. ~~[Outside the record: under~~ ==Under== Treasury's interim final rule of September 30, 2026 (91 FR ~~61688),~~ ==61688, 61691 to 61692),== any filing by January 18, 2028 meets the deadline, even a conditional one; comments are due November 30, 2026 (Recommendation ~~11).]~~ ==11).== **What New Hampshire would have to build.** A statutory issuer category, licensing, rules, and examiners able to supervise to the federal standard; the regulator delegation model (§5.1) does the first three by statute and leaves the detail to the regulator (CSBS, March 10). The ~~proposed~~ reserve, redemption, and capital rules of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) (Appendix ~~L)~~ ==K)== are the best signpost, though states keep discretion (CSBS, March 10). ==The OCC proposed these rules in early 2026 and issued them as a final rule on October 21, 2026 (91 FR 67000, October 23, 2026, effective January 18, 2027).== Recommendation 7 names the Banking Department as supervisor. Deputy Commissioner Moranti agreed the Banking Department is the logical supervisor for payment stablecoins that are not securities, and said ==that, speaking personally, he did not expect the Department to need more staff at first, since== the work resembles what ~~its bank and money transmitter examiners~~ ==it== already ~~do; its examiners are trained in blockchain and crypto. The Department would expect to begin with existing staff, cover licensing and examination through fees, and assess staffing about two years after enactment~~ ==does== (October 15). **New figure:** ```mermaid --- config: flowchart: nodeSpacing: 18 rankSpacing: 14 wrappingWidth: 300 --- flowchart TD iss["Payment stablecoin issuer (foreign issuers: only from a regime that Treasury finds comparable)"] --> path{"Which path?"} path -->|State| sq["State qualified issuer, licensed and supervised by the state"] path -->|Federal| fq["Federal qualified issuer: OCC, Federal Reserve, FDIC, or NCUA"] sq --> cert["Is the state regime certified by the Review Committee (Treasury, Federal Reserve, FDIC), and recertified yearly?"] cert -->|No| fq cert -->|Yes| size{"Over $10 billion?"} size -->|No| ok["State supervision continues"] size -->|Yes| big["Joint state and federal supervision unless waived; no federal charter needed"] ``` **Removed:** a version 3 figure. **Changed:** *Figure 4. GENIUS Act pathways as described to the Commission (Circle, August 19; CSBS, March ~~10).~~ ==10;== ~~Foreign-issuer~~ ==Scott,== ~~path~~ ==Circle,== ~~per~~ ==October== ~~[Outside~~ ==15).== ~~the~~ ==Foreign== ~~record:~~ ==issuers:== GENIUS ~~Act,~~ ==Act== section ~~18].~~ ==18.== Committee ~~role per [Outside the record:~~ ==membership:== Treasury interim final rule, September 30, ~~2026].*~~ ==2026 (91 FR 61688). No federal charter required above $10 billion: GENIUS Act sections 4(c)(3), 4(d), and 7(f).*== **If New Hampshire builds nothing.** A New Hampshire company could still issue under the federal path, and the state keeps additive consumer protection authority (Circle, August 19). Banks can issue tokenized deposits under existing law; Shawn Main of Vantage Bank reported the FDIC's position that "a deposit is a deposit" (May 13). What would be lost is a state-chartered home for smaller issuers. Banks offering tokenized deposits are using the Federal Reserve's FedNow instant payment service to settle (October 15). ~~[Outside the record: FedNow launched July 20, 2023 (Federal Reserve).]~~ > [!warning] What could go wrong > GENIUS requires issuers to have the technical ability to block, freeze, or seize tokens on lawful federal order (Circle, August ~~19). [Outside the record:~~ ==19;== GENIUS Act sections 4(a)(5) and ~~4(a)(6).]~~ ==4(a)(6)).== Parker Feld asked how that differs from a central bank digital currency (May 4). In New Hampshire the question has constitutional ~~weight under~~ ==weight:== Article 2-b ==of the state Constitution protects the right to live free from governmental intrusion in private information, and a freeze capability gives government a way to reach a person's money and financial activity through the issuer== (§7.2). Wyoming allows freezes only under a valid court order (Apollo, October 15, 2025); New Hampshire needs its own clear rules (Recommendations 3 and 9). ## 4.2 Yield: the variable that drives everything else **Changed:** GENIUS bars issuers from paying yield or interest to holders (Circle, August ~~19) [Outside the record:~~ ==19;== GENIUS Act section ~~4(a)(11)~~ ==4(a)(11), which== applies to ~~issuers;~~ ==issuers== ~~it~~ ==and== does not name affiliates or ~~exchanges],~~ ==exchanges),== and the OCC proposed a rebuttable presumption that an issuer is paying yield if an affiliate or related party pays holders (CSBS, March ~~10):~~ ==10).== ~~the~~ ==The== ~~issuer would be treated as paying yield unless it shows otherwise. This is a proposal, not a final rule. [Outside the record: OCC notice of proposed rulemaking, February 25, 2026 (91 FR 10202); the OCC has said it expects to issue a~~ ==OCC's== final rule ~~by~~ ==(issued October 21, 2026; 91 FR 67000, 67030), effective January 18, 2027, dropped== the ~~end~~ ==presumption as potentially both overinclusive and underinclusive, while keeping the OCC's authority to act against evasion== of ~~October~~ ==the== ~~2026~~ ==yield== ~~(press~~ ==prohibition== ~~reports).]~~ ==case by case.== Exchanges may still pay rewards (Chair, May 4). Banks see stablecoin yield as a potential existential threat to deposits; issuers see it as the key to adoption (Yevgeny Shrago, CSBS, March 10). Yield also decides where reserve earnings go (Parker Feld and Chair, May 4); Wyoming routes reserve income to the ~~state~~ ==state's school foundation fund== (October 15, 2025). ## 4.3 Tax friction: the real estate transfer tax **Changed:** ~~The~~ ==New Hampshire taxes sales and transfers of real estate (the real estate== transfer ==tax, RSA 78-B). The== tax ~~treats~~ ==also== ~~a~~ ==reaches== ~~transfer~~ ==transfers== of ~~an interest~~ ==interests== in a ==company that holds== real ~~estate~~ ==estate,== ~~holding~~ ==treating== ~~company~~ ==them== like ~~a transfer~~ ==transfers== of the real ~~estate,~~ ==estate== ~~so~~ ==itself. As a result,== every trade of a token issued by Porcupine Properties, a New Hampshire LLC (§8.3), would technically be taxable, and the token's compliance check cannot collect a tax. Matt Whitlock of Porcupine proposed taxing only a change in control, based on holders of more than 25% (February 10). ~~[Outside the record:~~ RSA 78-B:1-a, V taxes transfers of interests in real estate holding companies to the extent of the real estate's fair market ~~value;~~ ==value, and under== RSA 78-B:1 ~~sets~~ ==and 78-B:4, III the rate and== a minimum tax of $20 ==apply to each of buyer and seller== where the price is $4,000 or ~~less, and both buyer and seller pay.]~~ ==less.== A token trade of a few dollars can therefore carry the minimum ~~tax.~~ ==tax for each party.== Jennifer Ramsey of the Department of Revenue Administration ~~confirmed~~ ==said== that, as the statute is written, each such trade would ==probably== trigger the tax. She said any change is a policy decision for the Legislature, and offered data on holding company transfers and their revenue effect (October 15). ==Department of Revenue Administration data show that in fiscal year 2026 the tax on holding company transactions raised about $7.5 million from about 325 transactions (about 650 returns). Over half conveyed interests of 25% or less; exempting those under a 25% change-of-control test would reduce revenue by an estimated $550,000 to $600,000 a year. Transfers of more than 75% (about $5.9 million) would remain taxable. The effect on the remaining roughly $1 million cannot be determined, because the Department does not collect data on beneficial ownership of the interests not being conveyed (Department of Revenue Administration, fiscal year 2026 data, applying Porcupine's proposal as the Department understood it).== Members noted a harder case: a token used both for payment and as an interest in real estate, such as rent paid in tokens that build equity, may be taxed as a real estate transfer even when used as payment. Tokens that combine payment and asset features will raise questions the current tax and regulatory categories do not answer, a task suited to the Office of Financial Innovation (Recommendation 6) (October 15). ## 4.4 Financial stability and New Hampshire banks **Changed:** | Figure | Source and date | Premise | Note | |---|---|---|---| | ~~About~~ ==Up== ~~$1~~ ==to about $1.7== billion | ~~Deputy~~ ==American== ~~Commissioner~~ ==Bankers== ~~Moranti,~~ ==Association== ~~January~~ ==estimate== ~~14~~ ==for New Hampshire, cited by NHBA in the Chair's review, May 4, as about $1.9 billion; [Outside the record: since revised by the ABA to a range of $0.9 billion to $1.7 billion (American Bankers Association, New Hampshire one-pager, September 2026; R-46)]== | ~~Crypto~~ ==Potential== ~~money~~ ==outflow== ~~transmission~~ ==from== ~~by~~ ==NH== ~~Banking~~ ==banks== ~~Department~~ ==to== ~~licensees~~ ==payment== ~~in~~ ==stablecoins== ~~one~~ ==under== ~~quarter~~ ==the== ~~of~~ ==more== ~~2024~~ ==permissive== ~~(Moranti,~~ ==yield== ~~October 15)~~ ==outcome== | ~~A~~ ==From== ~~past~~ ==the== ~~data~~ ==banking== ~~point,~~ ==industry,== ~~not~~ ==which has== a ~~forecast;~~ ==stake== ~~not~~ ==in== ~~limited~~ ==the== ~~to~~ ==yield== ~~stablecoins; may not capture decentralized platforms~~ ==outcome== | | ~~Up to about $1.9 billion~~ | ~~NHBA, citing a national association estimate, in the Chair's review, May 4~~ | ~~Potential outflow from NH banks under the more permissive yield outcome~~ | ~~From the banking industry, which has a stake in the yield outcome~~ | | About $5 billion | Main, Vantage Bank, May 13 | A scenario of 10% erosion of NH commercial deposits; mapped to $160M to $430M less lending and 1,700 to 2,800 jobs at risk | Vantage sells a tokenized-deposit product (Hazel) | **Added:** ==One other figure in the record is sometimes read as a deposit-flight estimate, but it is not one. Deputy Commissioner Moranti reported about $1 billion in crypto money transmission by Banking Department licensees in one quarter of 2024 (January 14; clarified October 15). That figure covers all crypto assets, not only stablecoins, may not capture decentralized platforms, and measures money moved through licensees rather than deposits lost, so it should not be read as a measure of stablecoin outflows from New Hampshire banks.== ## 4.5 Network effects **Changed:** A payment ~~token~~ ==network== ~~is worth~~ ==becomes== more ~~the~~ ==useful as== more people ==and businesses== accept it, ==so users== and ~~liquidity~~ ==trading== ~~gathers~~ ==tend== ~~where~~ ==to== ~~it~~ ==gather on the networks that are== already ~~is.~~ ==largest (Chair, October 15).== The Chair asked whether the GENIUS Act's $10 billion threshold might "silo liquidity into small state-chartered networks." BitGo's Hahr described two paths: consolidation around a few winners with consortium-like governance, or many issuers linked through clearing mechanisms. He suggested supporting community banks in receiving, remitting, and potentially issuing stablecoins "as a way to expand network effects from within the existing banking system" (March 10). ~~Networks~~ ==Payment networks== are ==already== being built ~~for~~ ==to== ~~scale.~~ ==reach that scale by linking many institutions.== The BankChain Alliance draws on 40 state bankers ~~associations~~ ==associations, New Hampshire's among them== (Merrill, September 17); Roughrider Coin links about 92 North Dakota ~~institutions~~ ==banks and credit unions== (Healey, September 17); ==and== Wyoming's FRNT ~~is~~ ==was== live across six ~~chains~~ ==blockchains in April== (LayerZero, April ~~6).~~ ==6) and eight by August (§8.2).== ## 5.1 How states are approaching it **Changed:** On March 10, Yevgeny Shrago of the Conference of State Bank Supervisors (CSBS) described four state models: a general **virtual currency license** (New York, Illinois, California, Louisiana); **special purpose depository institutions**, uninsured and limited to non-lending digital asset activity (Wyoming, Nebraska); a **state-level GENIUS Act** that writes the federal provisions into state law (Florida, Georgia); and **regulator delegation**, in which the legislature creates a license and a category of stablecoin issuer and the regulator writes GENIUS-compliant rules (Maryland, Alabama). Shrago said ==the U.S.== Treasury had been encouraging ~~delegation.~~ ==delegation (Figure 5).== A fifth path is **the state as issuer**. Wyoming's Frontier Stable Token (FRNT), the only ~~example~~ ==state-issued stable token== in the record, is issued by a Governor-chaired state commission, backed 102% by cash, ~~short~~ ==short-term== Treasuries, and repurchase agreements, and sold through licensed service providers that verify customers' identities; reserve interest goes to the ~~state~~ ==state's== ~~for~~ ==school== ~~schools~~ ==foundation fund== (Anthony Apollo, October 15, 2025; Chair, May 4). ==North Dakota's Roughrider Coin is different: it is a stablecoin issued by a private bank for payments among North Dakota banks and credit unions, with the state-owned Bank of North Dakota providing governance and oversight, not a token issued by the state (§5.2).== Wyoming argues a state-issued token falls outside the GENIUS Act (Digital Chamber, November 12, 2025). Its operations are in §8.2. **Added:** ==Florida's stablecoin issuer approval for trust companies took effect October 1, 2026 (Fla. Stat. 658.997; ch. 2026-176, HB 175), and a separate Florida pilot lets agencies accept stablecoins for government fees (Fla. Stat. 17.72; ch. 2026-175). Georgia enacted a Payment Stablecoin Act in 2026 (HB 1272, Act 452); Alabama (HB 259, Act 2026-354) and Maryland (Maryland Stablecoin Act, 2026 Md. Laws ch. 514, effective January 1, 2027) have enacted laws; Delaware has proposed one [Outside the record: Chambers, 2026]; and Texas's 2023 money services law treats certain reserve-backed stablecoins as money (Tex. Fin. Code 152.003(19)). In New Hampshire, LSR 2027-0200, "regulating the use of stablecoins," and LSR 2027-0239, a task force to study emerging technologies and digital innovations, have been filed for 2027 (§3.4).== **Deleted:** ~~[Outside the record: Florida Statutes 658.997 and 17.72] Florida's stablecoin issuer approval for trust companies took effect October 1, 2026. [Outside the record: Georgia HB 1272 (2026); Alston & Bird, May 2026; Chambers 2026] Georgia enacted a Payment Stablecoin Act in 2026; Alabama and Maryland have enacted laws, Delaware has proposed one, and Texas's 2023 money services law treats certain reserve-backed stablecoins as money [Outside the record: Texas Finance Code chapter 152]. In New Hampshire, LSR 2027-0200 and LSR 2027-0239 have been filed for 2027 (§3.4).~~ ## 5.2 Three bank-led designs **Changed:** Three presenters showed ways for banks to carry dollars on a blockchain, each handling the moment value leaves the network ~~differently.~~ ==differently (Figures 6a to 6c).== **Hazel (Vantage Bank and Custodia Bank, May 13).** Each bank holds the token as a deposit. When it leaves the network, its backing moves to Custodia and the same token works as a stablecoin, preserving what Shawn Main of Vantage called the "singleness of money." Hazel is ==still== in ~~pilot;~~ ==a== ~~Vantage~~ ==pilot phase, and Vantage, which presented it,== sells ~~it.~~ ==it as a product (Appendix L).== **Added:** ==**Roughrider Coin (Fiserv and the Bank of North Dakota, September 17).** A dollar-backed token on a public blockchain that only state-approved North Dakota banks and credit unions may hold, used first as an intraday settlement rail among them. The Bank of North Dakota, a correspondent bank to about 90 institutions in the state, is the lead bank and admits members (Joe Healey). Fiserv, which sells the platform, described its token products as backed by 100% reserves in overnight bank deposits, and its multi-bank tokenized deposit as converting to a stablecoin when value leaves the network: the system "burns the tokenized deposit, and issues a stablecoin, in real time and without swaps" (Healey). [Outside the record: Roughrider went live on October 1, 2026 on the Solana blockchain as a permissioned, fully reserved stablecoin for bank-to-bank payments only, issued by VersaBank USA, N.A., which handles minting, burning, custody, and reserves; the Bank of North Dakota provides governance and oversight, calls the coin a "token deposit," its term for stablecoins, and distinguishes it from tokenized deposits such as JPM Coin (Fiserv, October 1, 2026; Bank of North Dakota, October 5, 2026).] Roughrider is therefore a closed stablecoin network among banks, not a tokenized-deposit network.== **Deleted:** ~~**Roughrider Coin (Fiserv and the Bank of North Dakota, September 17).** A dollar-backed token on a public blockchain that only state-approved North Dakota banks and credit unions may hold. The Bank of North Dakota, lead bank for about 92 institutions, admits members; reserves are 100% overnight bank deposits. When value leaves, Fiserv's system burns the tokenized deposit and issues a stablecoin in real time (Joe Healey). Fiserv sells the platform.~~ **Removed:** a version 3 figure. **New figure:** ```mermaid --- config: flowchart: wrappingWidth: 340 --- flowchart TD BND["Bank of North Dakota: lead bank; governance and oversight; admits members"] --> R1["About 92 approved North Dakota banks and credit unions"] VB["VersaBank USA, N.A.: issues, mints, and burns; holds custody and reserves"] --> T["Roughrider Coin: fully reserved stablecoin on Solana, held and transferred only among members"] R1 <-->|"bank-to-bank payments only"| T ``` **Changed:** *Figure 6b. Roughrider Coin: a closed ==stablecoin== network of approved North Dakota ~~institutions~~ ==institutions,== ~~led by~~ ==with== the Bank of North Dakota ==as lead bank== (Healey, September ~~17).*~~ ==17). [Outside the record: issuer, blockchain, and launch (Bank of North Dakota; Fiserv).]*== **BankChain Alliance (New Hampshire Bankers Association, September 17).** A bank-owned payments network whose members include 40 state bankers associations, New Hampshire's among them, though their 3,400 member banks are not the number signed up (Kristy Merrill). A technology-partner request for proposals was still open. Commission member Jim Kisch of Passumpsic Bank described a ==tokenized== deposit ~~token~~ ==backed== ~~reserved~~ ==1:1== ~~one for one at~~ ==by== the sender's bank that moves ~~at~~ ==instantly,== ~~once,~~ ==while== ~~with~~ ==the== ~~banks~~ ==corresponding== ~~settling~~ ==dollar== ~~dollars~~ ==settlement between financial institutions is finalized== by ==the== end of ==the business== day. **Figure revised.** The version 4 figure: ```mermaid flowchart TD B1["Tokenized deposit, 1:1 at the sender's bank"] --> B2["Ownership moves at once"] B2 --> B3["Banks settle dollars by end of day; exit design not yet chosen"] ``` ## 5.3 The models compared **Changed:** | | Wyoming FRNT | ~~State-qualified~~ ==State qualified== issuer (FL, GA style) | Hazel | Roughrider / Fiserv | BankChain | |---|---|---|---|---|---| | **Reserves** | Cash, short Treasuries, repos; 102% required | 1:1 cash and liquid assets (Circle) | Bank deposit; Custodia holds 1:1 outside network | 100% overnight bank deposits | 1:1 at member bank (Kisch) | | **Redemption** | "Dollar in, dollar out" via providers | At par (§4.1) | Deposit inside; stablecoin outside | At par | Not yet designed | | **Supervision** | Governor-chaired commission | State regulator, certified; federal above $10B | Bank regulators; "a deposit is a deposit" | Bank regulators; lead bank admits members | Bank regulators; 15-member industry board | | **Consumer protection** | Freeze or seize only by court order | Additive state protections (Circle) | Compliance coded in | Freeze, seize, recall like ACH returns | Not yet designed | | **Cost to the state** | $5.8M FY2025 budget, under $2M spent | Banking Department licensing and exams | None identified | ND uses its state bank; Healey: not required | None identified | | **Privacy** | Seeking a "Goldilocks zone" | Must be able to freeze on lawful federal order | Main urged protocol-level standards | Banks keep customer data | Stated RFP principle | ## 5.4 Abroad **Changed:** ~~International~~ ==Most== ~~lessons~~ ==of what the Commission heard about other countries== came ~~mostly~~ ==at== ~~on~~ ==its== October 15, ~~2025.~~ ==2025 meeting.== The Global Blockchain Business Council called the ~~EU's~~ ==European== ~~MiCA~~ ==Union's Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (MiCA)== the most comprehensive ==framework for== crypto ~~framework;~~ ==assets.== Plume Network ~~cited~~ ==described two features abroad meant to attract issuers:== Bermuda's ~~bankruptcy-remote~~ segregated account ~~companies~~ ==companies, which keep each pool of assets separate and out of reach of other creditors if the company fails (bankruptcy-remote),== and Hong Kong's grant covering half the cost of issuing tokenized bonds. ~~Leading~~ ==The leading== jurisdictions ==described== fold tokens into ==their== existing financial ~~law.~~ ==law rather than building a separate regime.== ## 6. Benefits and risks for New Hampshire **Changed:** | Use | Benefit claimed | Risk raised | | -------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | **Government payments** | Tax refunds that arrive almost at once (David, Lynq, May 13); real-time audit of benefit programs (Uchill, Ceres, January 14); Wyoming's reserve interest funds schools (October 15, 2025). | Conditional, expiring, or geofenced money and "positive list" spending (Parker Feld, May 4), including geofencing of a state grant token (Gaal, April 6); revenue falls when interest rates fall (Wyoming, October 15, 2025). The record has no figures on Wyoming's adoption or revenue (§8.2). | | **Community-bank deposits** | Stablecoin speed with deposits kept in local lending (Main, May 13; Healey, Merrill, and Kisch, September 17). | Deposit flight, up to about $5 billion in one vendor scenario (Table 4.1, §4.4); the effect on the Banking Department's self-funded model is "real and unresolved" (May 13). | | **Tokenized real-world assets** (§8.3) | Fractional ownership, and municipal bonds in $20 units instead of $1,000 (Whitlock, Porcupine, February 10); settlement and collateral that move 24/7 (Lynq, May 13; Canton, February 10). | Not every asset reduces to digital fields (Parker Feld, May 4); rent-to-own consumer protection (Garod, February 10); ==what happens when the model goes bad, including== bankruptcy, eviction, and ==whether== a ~~possible~~ de facto mortgage ~~(Moranti,~~ ==has been created, and the issuer's control of both the token's value and the company's value (Banking Department,== February 10); the real estate transfer tax (§4.3). | | **Blockchain-based trusts** (§9) | Code no trustee can override could ease the impossibility defense and draw trust business (Huyett, November 12, 2025). | ~~Admin~~ ==The protection depends on the contract being sufficiently decentralized that no person can change it; admin== keys, oracles, and upgrade paths can give a person control; the draft has no savings clause for creditors. The record has no opposing trust-law analysis. | ## 7.1 Consumer protection **Changed:** **The redemption gap.** Direct redemption at par is typically open only to institutions; ordinary holders sell on the secondary market at whatever price it sets (§3.1, Figure 3). "This backstop is not available to retail consumers," BitGo's Eugene Hahr said; if market makers step back under stress, the result can be "cascading spread widening," as in the Terra/Luna collapse (BitGo, March 10). Run risk is present in all financial markets; what may be distinctive here is trading around the clock and automated or agentic activity that can move faster than people can respond ~~(October~~ ==(a member, October== 15). **Freeze, seize, and recall.** Many tokens let an issuer stop or reverse transactions. Hedera described controls so a "fat-fingered" transfer need not be a permanent loss (December 10, 2025); Fiserv described recall functions "analogous to ACH return codes" (September 17). ==In his presentation,== Commission member Andy Schwab ran the USDC contract's `isBlacklisted` function on his own wallet and showed the issuer's blacklister address and its recent actions; technically, he said, a freeze is "no more complex than a function call" (September 17). The Chair noted an FBI-coordinated freeze of approximately $344 million of Tether on Tron (May 4). These controls are choices by particular issuers, not properties of blockchains. They protect against error and theft, but someone holds a key that can stop a person's money (§7.2; §9). The Chair noted the same tension in banking, where controls built for safety can be misused (October 15). [Outside the record: on October 14, 2026, the OCC reported that ==all== nine ~~large~~ ==of the largest national== banks ==it supervises== had policies or practices ~~from~~ ==between== 2020 ~~to~~ ==and September== 2025 that may have debanked customers (OCC News Release 2026-90).] **Agentic payments.** Confirmed blockchain payments cannot be disputed and clawed back like card and ACH payments (BitGo, March 10). ~~On~~ ==In a live demonstration on== September 17, Schwab's AI agent paid 0.001 USDC for a web page within ~~seconds;~~ ==seconds.== ~~the~~ ==The== demonstration produced roughly two dozen on-chain transactions, each, he observed, a taxable event and a potential OFAC or FinCEN compliance exposure. Rowland Graus of Chainlink Labs, which offers agent payment products, warned that spending limits and allow-lists are "necessary but not sufficient" and that tax reporting could grow from thousands of transactions per user to hundreds of thousands (September 17). Who is liable when an agent does something the user never ruled out is unsettled (Hahr, March 10). ## 7.2 Privacy **Changed:** **Where New Hampshire starts.** Part I, Article 2-b of the New Hampshire Constitution provides: "An individual's right to live free from governmental intrusion in private or personal information is natural, essential, and ~~inherent."~~ ==inherent"== ~~[Outside the record: N.H.~~ ==(N.H.== Const. Pt. I, Art. 2-b, adopted ~~2018~~ ==2018,== ~~(CACR~~ ==CACR== ~~16); New Hampshire Law Library.]~~ ==16).== The New Hampshire Supreme Court has applied Article 2-b in deciding when records held by private organizations may be reached, in a case about counseling records; this report draws an inference from it for financial ~~records.~~ ==records== ~~[Outside the record: *See*~~ ==(*see*== State v. Zarella, ~~177~~ ==2025== N.H. ~~328~~ ==20,== ~~(2025).]~~ ==343== ~~[Outside~~ ==A.3d== ~~the~~ ==104== ~~record:~~ ==(May== ~~RSA~~ ==1,== ~~359-C:3,~~ ==2025)).== ~~359-C:4,~~ ==New== ~~and 359-C:8 to 359-C:11.] The~~ ==Hampshire's== Right to Privacy ~~Act~~ ==Act, RSA 359-C, protects customers' financial records from state access in connection with civil or criminal investigations. It== lets state officials obtain a customer's records from a ==financial institution (a== bank, trust company, ~~or~~ ==savings association,== credit ~~union~~ ==union, or other person organized under state banking law) or a creditor== only with the customer's authorization, an administrative or judicial subpoena with notice and a chance to challenge, or a search warrant, subject to exceptions for supervisory agencies and certain health and human services ~~matters.~~ ==matters== ~~It~~ ==(RSA 359-C:3, 359-C:4, and 359-C:8 to 359-C:11). An issuer chartered as a New Hampshire trust company would be covered, but the Act== does not reach ~~stablecoin~~ ==money== ~~issuers, exchanges,~~ ==transmitters== or ~~money~~ ==exchanges== ~~transmitters.~~ ==that are not organized under banking law.== **Pseudonymous, not anonymous.** Blockchains are "pseudonymous (not anonymous)," which makes tracing possible (Anchorage Digital, January 14). No names are stored on-chain, but every transaction is permanently recorded, and ==blockchain== analytics ==(on-chain risk management)== firms combine the ledger with sanctions, law enforcement, and dark web data to cluster addresses by owner (Elliptic, August 19; reconstructed minutes, see Elliptic deck). Schwab showed about $4.2 billion of USDC on one network, across about 11 million wallets, "all publicly visible" (September 17). For an ordinary person, ==a== public ~~chains~~ ==chain== ~~show~~ ==can== ~~too~~ ==reveal== ~~much,~~ ==a== ~~permanently.~~ ==full payment history, permanently, to anyone who links an address to its owner.== **Figure revised.** The version 4 figure: ```mermaid --- config: flowchart: nodeSpacing: 20 rankSpacing: 18 wrappingWidth: 400 --- flowchart TD A["Fully transparent public chain Every amount and address visible (Schwab demo, September 17)"] --> B["Pseudonymous chain plus analytics Addresses clustered to owners (Anchorage, January 14; Elliptic, August 19)"] B --> C["Permissioned or institution-private ledgers Each party sees its own data (Canton, February 10; Lynq, May 13)"] C --> D["Selective disclosure Verifiable credentials, blinding keys (Hedera, December 10, 2025; Liquid, February 10)"] D --> E["Zero-knowledge proofs Prove a fact, reveal nothing else (February 10 discussion; Schwab, September 17)"] ``` **Changed:** **Designs the Commission heard** (Figure 7): verifiable credentials that prove one fact, such as age 21 or over, without revealing identity (Hedera, December 10, 2025); institution-level privacy (Canton, February 10); confidential transactions with blinding keys (Liquid Network, Porcupine, February 10); a private settlement chain whose broker-dealer keeps records seven years (Lynq, May 13); Chainlink's Confidential Compute (April 6); and zero-knowledge proofs, ~~which~~ ==a cryptographic method that lets someone== prove a statement ==is true, such as that a person is over a certain age,== without revealing the ==underlying== data (February 10 discussion; Schwab, September 17). Kisch noted that zero-knowledge proofs are hard to square with know-your-customer and sanctions checks, which "need more than a simple yes/no verification"; the Chair observed that today's compliance systems create "honeypots" of personal information that ==attract hackers and are vulnerable to data breaches, a problem== zero-knowledge proofs could address (February 10). **Deleted:** ~~Privacy is a set of design choices: what goes on a public ledger, who holds the keys, what an issuer must collect, and what showing the government must make before it looks or freezes. Recommendation 9 sets the operative rules.~~ **Changed:** **Who can see a payment.** In Figure 8, government can obtain identified records from the issuer or a bank through legal process and can direct a freeze. ==Those two points, government obtaining records and government directing a freeze, are where== Article 2-b ~~is aimed at those arrows.~~ ==applies.== **Figure revised.** The version 4 figure: ```mermaid --- config: flowchart: nodeSpacing: 30 rankSpacing: 35 --- flowchart TD P["Payer's wallet"] -->|"stablecoin transfer"| R["Recipient's wallet"] P -.->|"identity (KYC) records at onboarding"| I["Issuer or bank"] P -->|"addresses, amount, time"| L["Public ledger: anyone can read"] L --> AF["Analytics firms: cluster addresses to owners"] AF -->|"risk flags"| I G["Government"] -->|"legal process; freeze or blacklist direction"| I I -->|"identified records"| G G -.- Q["NH Const. Pt. I, Art. 2-b: freedom from governmental intrusion in private information"] ``` **Changed:** *Figure 8. Who can see what in a stablecoin payment. Article 2-b's question is when ~~the~~ government ~~arrows~~ ==may== ~~should~~ ==obtain== ~~be~~ ==these== ~~allowed,~~ ==records or direct a freeze,== and on what showing.* **Wyoming and the skeptic.** Wyoming described a ban on forced private-key disclosure and freeze and seize "only via valid court order" (Apollo, October 15, 2025), ~~untested by~~ ==though== the ~~Commission.~~ ==Commission did not examine how these rules work in practice.== Dr. Karen Parker Feld asked who can obtain a citizen's purchase records, how the GENIUS freeze requirement for "other lawful orders" differs from a central bank digital currency (CBDC), and for a citizen opt-out (May 4; §11.3). The Chair endorsed "privacy in the private sphere, transparency in the government sphere" (May 4). **The federal backdrop on CBDCs.** ~~[Outside~~ ==Executive== ~~the~~ ==Order== ~~record:~~ ==14178== ~~a January~~ ==(January== 23, ~~2025~~ ==2025;== ~~federal~~ ==90== ~~executive~~ ==FR== ~~order~~ ==8647)== prohibits federal ~~agencies~~ ==agencies, except as required by law,== from ~~promoting~~ ==acting to establish, issue, or promote== a CBDC, and Title XI of the 21st Century ROAD to Housing ~~Act,~~ ==Act== ~~P.L.~~ ==(P.L.== 119-101, ~~temporarily~~ ==enacted July 11, 2026)== prohibits a Federal Reserve ==retail== CBDC through ==December 31,== 2030 (Congressional Research Service, ~~IF11471).]~~ ==IF11471).== Parker Feld noted that a CBDC prohibition expected in the National Defense Authorization Act was not included there, and that the bar now in law is temporary (October 15). Parker Feld's point stands regardless: a private stablecoin with mandatory freeze capability can raise some of the same concerns as a CBDC, depending on who can direct the freeze and on what showing. **Added:** ==Privacy in digital money is not fixed by the technology; it follows from design choices. Four matter most: what information goes on a public ledger, where anyone can read it; who holds the keys that can freeze or move tokens; what personal information an issuer must collect from customers; and what legal showing, such as a warrant or court order, the government must make before it examines records or freezes a token. Recommendation 9 sets the operative rules for the choices that belong to the State.== ## 7.3 Environmental protection **Changed:** The stablecoins and tokenized assets before the Commission run on smart-contract networks, and smart-contract networks tend to use consensus mechanisms ==(the method a network uses to agree on which transactions are valid)== other than ~~proof~~ ==proof-of-work, the method Bitcoin uses, in which computers compete to solve puzzles and consume large amounts== of ~~work.~~ ==electricity.== The Chair noted that ~~the~~ ==most== networks used for stablecoins and real-world asset tokenization use ~~proof~~ ==proof-of-stake,== ~~of~~ ==in== ~~stake~~ ==which validators put up tokens as collateral instead== (January 14); Wyoming's FRNT ~~is~~ ==runs== ~~live~~ ==on== ~~across six~~ ==several== chains, including Solana (LayerZero, April ~~6).~~ ==6; §8.2).== [Outside the record: Ethereum has used ~~proof of stake~~ ==proof-of-stake== since September 2022; Solana also uses ~~proof of stake;~~ ==proof-of-stake;== Hedera uses hashgraph consensus secured by ~~proof of stake;~~ ==proof-of-stake;== Base, Optimism, and Arbitrum settle to Ethereum; the Liquid Network used by Porcupine Properties is a federated sidechain (network documentation).] The frameworks recommended in this report regulate issuers, reserves, and records, not consensus methods, and New Hampshire law already protects node ~~operation, mining,~~ ==operation== and staking ==from state or local prohibition and exempts mining and node operation from money transmitter licensing== (RSA 359-V:3). The Commission therefore identifies no additional environmental protection mechanism they require. The record also shows the technology serving environmental work: Virginia's Department of Environmental Quality uses a Hedera-based tool to track Chesapeake Bay watershed impact (Hedera, December 10, 2025). ## 7.4 Risk management **Figure revised.** The version 4 figure: ```mermaid flowchart LR A["Run risk loss of confidence, de-peg"] --> A1["Reserves, redemption rules, disclosure"] B["Keys and custody compromised keys, contract flaws"] --> B1["Audits, multi-party keys, mint caps"] C["Illicit finance sanctions, theft, scams"] --> C1["Analytics, blacklisting, transaction monitoring"] D["Leverage and contagion DeFi rehypothecation"] --> D1["Collateral limits, liquidation rules"] E["Consumer error wrong address, agent mistakes"] --> E1["Recall functions, guardrails, labeling"] ``` **Changed:** **Run risk.** CSBS warned that pushing deposits into an uninsured system without bank-equivalent capital "recreates shadow banking run risks" (March 10). The OCC's ~~proposed~~ reserve and ~~liquidation~~ ==redemption== ~~rules~~ ==rules, now final,== aim to prevent runs (Appendix ~~L).~~ ==K).== **Illicit finance.** Elliptic described state-sponsored theft, sanctions evasion through mixers, elder fraud, and ransomware, and said regulators increasingly expect blockchain transaction monitoring (Elliptic, August 19; ~~reconstructed minutes,~~ see ~~Elliptic~~ ==presentation== ~~deck).~~ ==slides).== **Keys and custody.** Whoever controls the keys controls the token. [Outside the record: on March 22, 2026, ~~the~~ ==an attacker used a compromised privileged signing key to mint about 80 million unbacked== Resolv Labs USR ~~stablecoin~~ ==stablecoins, and USR== lost ~~more~~ ==as== ~~than~~ ==much== ~~70%~~ ==as 80%== of its ~~value~~ ==value;== ~~after~~ ==Chainalysis== ~~a~~ ==traced== ~~compromised~~ ==the== ~~private key was used~~ ==failure== to ~~mint~~ ==an== ~~80~~ ==off-chain== ~~million~~ ==minting== ~~unbacked~~ ==service== ~~tokens;~~ ==that== ~~Chainalysis~~ ==relied== ~~attributed it to~~ ==on== a privileged ~~off-chain~~ ==private== ~~signer~~ ==key,== with no ==maximum== mint ~~cap~~ ==limit== ~~(Decrypt;~~ ==(Chainalysis;== ~~FinanceFeeds).]~~ ==Decrypt).]== Safeguards in the record include Chainlink's "Secure Mint" (April 6), 6-of-7 multi-approval signing and three custody models, from qualified third-party custody to multi-signature self-custody (Fortris, December 10, 2025), Wyoming's state-owned keys and contracts (April 6), and Fiserv's fail-safe issuance (September 17). The controls that protect consumers are also single points of failure, so a framework should settle in advance, in ~~writing,~~ ==published policy or statute,== who holds each key and what must happen before it is used. ## 8.1 What New Hampshire already has **Changed:** Building on the 2022 Commission's work (§2.6), the state has the DAO law, RSA 301-B; the Blockchain Basic Laws, RSA 359-V; and ==authority for== a blockchain dispute docket, RSA ~~491:7-c.~~ ==491:7-c== ~~[Outside the record: HB 645 (2024), Ch.~~ ==(2024,== 263; ~~HB 1073 (2026), Ch.~~ ==2026,== 131; ~~HB~~ ==2026,== ~~639 (2026), Ch. 286]~~ ==286).== UNH is building the DAO registry (Chair, September 17), which will accept stablecoin payments for fees (§3.4). **Law already on the books.** ~~[Outside the record: RSA 399-G:3, VII (2024, 368:1).]~~ The money transmitter law ==(RSA 399-G:3, VII; 2024, 368:1)== exempts persons who sell or issue payment instruments or stored value solely in convertible virtual currency, or who receive it for transmission, subject to the Consumer Protection Act. ~~[Outside the record: Laws 2022, ch. 281; Laws 2023, ch. 236.]~~ The state adopted UCC Article 12 on controllable electronic records, conformed to the final uniform text, and its UCC defines money to exclude government currency in electronic form, so a central bank digital currency is not "money" under New Hampshire's commercial ~~code.~~ ==code (2022, 281; 2023, 236).== RSA 359-C limits state access to financial records (§7.2). ~~[Outside the record: Department of Revenue Administration.]~~ The state has no general sales tax, and its interest and dividends tax is repealed for taxable periods beginning after December 31, ~~2024.~~ ==2024 (RSA 77; Department of Revenue Administration).== ## 8.2 Wyoming: what a state issuer looks like in practice **Changed:** LayerZero called Wyoming's token "live in production (not a pilot)" (April 6). Reserve interest goes to the state (§5.1). ~~**The~~ ==The== record contains no adoption figures and no revenue actually paid to the ~~state.** [Outside the record: Franklin Templeton; Wyoming factbook; PR Newswire]~~ ==state.== FRNT launched publicly on January 7, ~~2026,~~ ==2026== and ==was live on eight blockchains by August. On August 18, 2026== Wyoming ~~later~~ moved ~~its~~ ==FRNT's== cross-chain ~~and~~ ==infrastructure== ~~proof-of-reserve~~ ==from== ~~functions~~ ==LayerZero== to ~~Chainlink,~~ ==Chainlink's== ~~retiring~~ ==CCIP,== ~~LayerZero.~~ ==and on September 2, 2026 it added Chainlink Proof of Reserve, alongside The Network Firm's examinations [Outside the record: Kraken; Wyoming Stable Token Commission releases via PR Newswire, August 18 and September 2, 2026].== ## 8.3 Tokenized real-world assets: where New Hampshire can lead **Changed:** Tokenization records ownership of an existing asset, such as a Treasury bill, fund share, bond, or real estate, as a token on a blockchain. The Global Blockchain Business Council (GBBC) put tokenized RWAs above $10 billion to $15 billion on chain in 2025, led by U.S. Treasuries, citing projections of $1 trillion to $3 trillion by 2030 ~~(Zales,~~ ==(Barrero Zalles,== October 15, 2025). The ~~Chair's~~ ==Chair== later ~~figure~~ ==reported== ~~is~~ ==about== ~~in~~ ==$31== ~~§3.2.~~ ==billion (May 4; §3.2).== Most of what is tokenized is a legal claim, such as a fund share or LLC interest, and the law governing the claim still applies: "existing legal requirements don't disappear" ~~(Zales,~~ ==(Barrero Zalles,== October 15, 2025). In this report, tokenized real-world assets are tokens backed by assets such as real estate, commodities, Treasuries, or fund holdings; the report does not address markets in tokenized securities such as tokenized stocks (§2.5). New Hampshire community banks could trade tokenized deposits with one another on the Canton Network (Lascar, February 10), and ~~Banking Commissioner Galdieri called~~ Ceres Coin ~~"the~~ ==was described in discussion as essentially a== stablecoin version of ~~the PDIP,"~~ the state's Public Deposit Investment Pool ==(PDIP), the State Treasurer's investment pool for public funds== (January 14). Matt Whitlock of Porcupine Properties showed how tokenization could open New Hampshire real estate to small investors: the property sits in an ordinary LLC whose shares are issued as "Pine" tokens, with compliance enforced before transfers reach the chain (February 10). He also modeled a rent-to-own path that, on a $300,000 home, matched a 30-year mortgage at an effective rate of about 10.81% (his estimate). The model was theoretical, and it drew consumer-protection concerns from ==Senior== Assistant Attorney General Garod and ~~Deputy~~ ==questions== ~~Commissioner~~ ==from== ~~Moranti~~ ==the Banking Department about what happens when the model goes bad== (see "What stands in the way," below). ~~The~~ ==As written, the== real estate transfer tax ~~treats~~ ==would probably treat== every token trade as taxable (§4.3), as Figure 10 shows. **Figure revised.** The version 4 figure: ```mermaid flowchart TD P["NH property"] --> L["Held by an LLC"] L --> T["LLC equity to be issued as tokens"] T --> W1["Investor wallet"] W1 -- "token transfer" --> W2["Investor wallet"] W1 -. "each transfer is a transfer of an interest in a real estate holding company" .-> X["Real estate transfer tax probably applies (DRA); token check can only allow or deny"] ``` **Changed:** *Figure 10. The tokenized real estate structure presented by Porcupine Properties, and where the transfer tax problem arises ~~(February~~ ==(Whitlock,== ~~10).*~~ ==February 10; DRA, October 15).*== **What New Hampshire already has.** UCC Article 12 (§8.1) sets rules for who controls a digital asset and how it is transferred and ~~pledged.~~ ==pledged== ~~[Outside~~ ==(2022,== ~~the record: Laws 2022, ch. 281 (HB 1503)]~~ ==281).== The same act ~~exempted~~ ==expanded the existing exemption of== certain consumptive "open blockchain tokens" from parts of state securities ~~law,~~ ==law (RSA 421-B:1-102(35-a) and 421-B:2-202(25); 2017, 172; 2022, 281:82 to 83),== and RSA 421-B governs a security whatever form its records take. **What presenters proposed.** Plume Network recommended encouraging tokenized municipal bonds, as Hong Kong does; a Bermuda-style framework of bankruptcy-remote entities holding the asset behind each token; recognizing ledger-based shares, as Switzerland does; and accepting verified credentials in place of repeated identity checks (October 15, 2025). Prof. Oranburg cited certificateless ==(uncertificated)== tokenized ~~shares~~ ==shares, recorded only electronically with no paper certificate,== as attractive to issuers (October 15, 2025). **What stands in the way.** The real estate transfer tax (§4.3); consumer protection in retail real estate offerings ~~(Garod~~ ==(Garod, February 10)== and ~~Moranti,~~ ==failure scenarios such as bankruptcy, eviction, and a de facto mortgage (Banking Department,== February 10); and the gap between a token and its asset, since not every feature reduces to digital fields (Parker Feld, May 4). Recommendation 8 addresses the first ~~two;~~ ==two,== ~~Recommendation~~ ==and== ~~13~~ ==its== ~~studies~~ ==voluntary safe harbor for verifiable tokens addresses== the third. **Verifying the backing.** A token is only as good as the asset behind it, and the record shows tools for checking that link. Chainlink's ~~proof~~ ==proof-of-reserves== ~~of reserves~~ ==service== compares the tokens in circulation with the reserves held off chain, and its "Secure Mint" blocks minting beyond verified backing (April 6). Lynq issues its fund shares on a public chain for proof-of-reserves visibility (May 13). Two limits came out in the same discussions. ~~Proof of reserves~~ ==Proof-of-reserves== reads from the issuer's designated source of truth, such as the custodian, fund administrator, or bank (Cunningham, April 6), so it is only as reliable as that source. And Chainlink, which sells the service, said automated attestations are "substantially cheaper" than recurring third-party audits (April 6), which makes them a complement to audits, not a substitute. BitGo urged standard disclosures of reserve composition and audit or attestation frequency, and reserves held with qualified custodians (March 10). The Commission sought a briefing from The Network Firm, the proof-of-reserves provider for Wyoming's token, but ~~it~~ ==no== ~~was~~ ==briefing== ~~not~~ ==took== ~~held~~ ==place== (May 13). ~~[Outside the record: no~~ ==No== state or model law yet sets ~~proof-of-reserve~~ ==proof-of-reserves== or audit standards for tokenized real-world assets. The nearest benchmarks govern stablecoins and custodians: the GENIUS Act requires a monthly public reserve report examined by a registered public accounting firm (12 U.S.C. ~~5903(a)(3));~~ ==5903(a)(1)(C) and (a)(3));== New York's 2022 stablecoin guidance requires daily full backing, segregated reserves at approved custodians, and independent attestations ~~(NYDFS);~~ ==(NYDFS guidance, June 8, 2022);== California's Digital Financial Assets Law requires a licensee to hold enough of each digital asset to cover customers' claims, treats those assets as held in trust for customers in bankruptcy even if commingled, and requires audited annual financial statements above $2 million in California revenue and reviewed statements below it (Cal. Fin. Code 3503 and 3211; licensing required from July 1, 2026, Cal. Fin. Code 3201); Illinois's 2025 Digital Assets and Consumer Protection Act requires custodians to hold enough of each digital asset to cover customers' claims, segregate it, and not lend, pledge, or hypothecate it, and authorizes rules on audit requirements for customer assets (205 ILCS 731/5-10, P.A. 104-428, effective August 18, 2025); the EU's MiCA requires an independent reserve audit every six months for asset-referenced tokens ~~(Article~~ ==(Regulation (EU) 2023/1114, Article== 36); and the AICPA's 2025 Criteria for Stablecoin Reporting give accountants a common standard for these ~~examinations.]~~ ==examinations [Outside the record: AICPA, March 6, 2025].== Recommendation 8 adapts these benchmarks to tokenized real-world assets as a voluntary safe harbor. ## 8.4 Community banks and programmable money **Changed:** For New Hampshire banks, the opportunity is faster, programmable payments without losing the deposits that fund local loans. Commission member Jim Kisch ~~described~~ ==gave an example of how a transfer could be held in== a smart-contract escrow ==and== released automatically once a lien waiver is acknowledged (September 17). ==The Commission received no independent estimate of jobs the industry would create.== The only job ~~estimate~~ ==figure== in the record came from a party with a ~~stake~~ ==stake,== and ==it== counts jobs at risk, not new ones: 1,700 to 2,800 under Vantage's deposit-erosion scenario (Main, May 13; Table 4.1, §4.4). ## 8.5 Agentic commerce **Changed:** ~~Schwab~~ ==Agentic== ~~demonstrated~~ ==commerce means software agents, often built on artificial intelligence, that find, buy, and pay for things on== a ~~software~~ ==person's behalf within limits the person sets. Blockchain payments let such agents pay very small amounts at machine speed: in a live demonstration, Schwab's== agent ~~paying~~ ==paid== a fraction of a cent for a web page ~~(§7.1);~~ ==(§7.1).== Chainlink's Rowland Graus said verifiable on-chain agent activity "remains small" (September 17). Graus explained why: the on-chain environment is hostile, with constant spam and theft attempts; tooling is fragmented; mistakes are usually irreversible; and even a simple request, such as finding the best yield on a stablecoin, requires an agent to resolve the user's intent, compare options across protocols and chains, and build a correct transaction, while the user sees only the result. Guardrails such as spending limits and allow-lists remove most high-risk errors but cannot ensure an agent acts well within its permitted scope, a principal-agent problem. He expects agents to be tied to a human operator for legal reasons, inheriting the operator's identity credentials so they can buy regulated assets (September 17). The Chair described the task as putting a deterministic boundary around non-deterministic software (September 17). Members saw agentic payments as too new for specific recommendations and asked that the area be followed, including who is responsible for what an agent does (October 15; Recommendation 13). The tax burden Schwab described is federal: such a payment in New Hampshire triggers no state sales or personal income tax (§8.1), a point worth making to firms building agent payments. BitGo suggested treating stablecoin transactions as cash equivalents for state tax purposes (March 10); Recommendation 13 studies the business profits and business enterprise taxes. ## 9.1 Why trusts are in the mandate **Changed:** ==New Hampshire is a trust-friendly jurisdiction: its Trust Code, RSA 564-B, allows self-settled asset protection trusts (§9.2), and its trust industry draws firms from out of state (§8.1). Huyett argued that recognizing blockchain-based trusts could extend that position, because a trust whose terms are carried out by code no one can alter would strengthen the protection such trusts offer and attract new trust business to the state (November 12, 2025).== RSA 383:26 names blockchain-based trusts alongside stable tokens and RWAs, though the topic is trust and creditor law. Ian Huyett, who presented it (§9.2), noted that no other state's commission had taken it up (November 12, 2025). ## 9.2 Proposals made to the Commission **Changed:** Attorney Ian Huyett, a New Hampshire Blockchain Council board member, presented an article co-authored with Brian Quirk (November 12, 2025). Self-settled asset protection trusts, recognized under RSA 564-B, rest largely on the "defense of impossibility": a court cannot hold a person in contempt for failing to do the impossible. Huyett's thesis is that a decentralized smart contract has no trustee and so no human "back ~~door."~~ ==door" (Figure 11).== He cited the Cook Islands, where he said asset protection trust business is roughly one-third of GDP, as the value of being an early jurisdiction. *Figure 11. How a blockchain-based asset protection trust is meant to work, and the question a court would ask (Huyett, November 12, 2025). The ~~lower~~ ==right-hand== path shows the weakness discussed in Appendix ~~I.*~~ ==H.*== He proposed jurisdiction over such trusts, spendthrift protection for qualifying smart contracts, a presumed impossibility defense, a statutory definition of a decentralized smart contract, and a blockchain docket (since enacted, §2.6). The draft language needs work (Appendix ~~I). [Outside the record: 11 U.S.C. 548(e); FTC v. Affordable Media, 179 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 1999).]~~ ==H).== Federal law also limits it: a bankruptcy court can reach transfers to a self-settled trust made to hinder creditors within ten years before ~~filing,~~ ==filing (11 U.S.C. 548(e)),== and a federal court has rejected a self-created impossibility ~~defense.~~ ==defense (FTC v. Affordable Media, 179 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 1999)).== ## 9.3 Commission position **Changed:** > [!question] ~~Proposed~~ ==Motion 14 (§9.3), proposed== for Commission vote > The Commission endorses the concept of blockchain-based asset protection trusts as a promising extension of New Hampshire's trust leadership, and recommends that the draft be redrafted, placed in RSA 564-B, and reviewed by the Attorney General and the trust bar, for introduction no later than the 2028 session, resolving the points in Appendix ~~I~~ ==H== (Recommendation 12). > *Possible alternatives:* endorse the draft for introduction as written; refer for further study without endorsement. ## 10. Findings **Changed:** **Finding 4. States are moving, along several models.** CSBS identified four state models (March 10); Wyoming issues its own token (October 15, 2025), and North Dakota runs a bank-led closed network (Fiserv, September 17). ~~[Outside the record:~~ Florida, Georgia, Alabama, and Maryland have since enacted stablecoin ~~laws.]~~ ==laws.== (§5.1) **Finding 5. Bank-led designs can keep deposits local.** Hazel (May ~~13), Roughrider Coin,~~ ==13)== and the BankChain Alliance (September 17) ~~each~~ ==keep value as tokenized deposits inside a bank network and== handle value leaving ~~the~~ ==it== ~~bank~~ ==differently, and North Dakota's Roughrider Coin shows banks using a closed stablecoin== network ~~differently;~~ ==among themselves (Healey, September 17);== the FDIC position, as reported, is that a tokenized deposit is a deposit (Main, May 13). (§5.2) **Finding 6. Deposit flight is the most-cited risk, and its size is uncertain.** Interested parties estimated up to about ~~$1.9~~ ==$1.7== billion ~~(NH~~ ==(American== Bankers Association, ==as revised;== cited ==at about $1.9 billion== by the Chair, May ~~4)~~ ==4, for the NH Bankers Association)== and about $5 billion under a 10% erosion scenario (Vantage Bank, May 13); the Banking Department called the effect on its funding "real and unresolved" (May 13), and later said its greater concern is fewer state-chartered choices for consumers (October 15). (§4.4) **Finding 7. A state token could compete with community banks for deposits; bank-led designs show how the two can work together.** A state token earns revenue by drawing dollars into reserves, while bank-led designs aim to slow deposit migration (Mike Dennehy, May 13; §11.2). In North Dakota, the state bank and about 92 community institutions work in one ~~network,~~ ==closed network (Fiserv, September 17),== and ~~converting~~ ==designs that convert a tokenized deposit== to a stablecoin only when value leaves ~~the~~ ==a bank== network ~~bridges~~ ==bridge== the two forms ~~(Fiserv,~~ ==(Hazel, May 13; Fiserv,== September 17). (§11.2) **Finding 9. Privacy is a design choice, and New Hampshire's Constitution speaks to it.** Every public blockchain transaction is permanently traceable (Anchorage, January 14; Elliptic, August 19), and federal law requires issuers to be able to freeze or seize tokens (Circle, August 19). ~~[Outside~~ ==Article 2-b of== the ~~record:~~ ==state== ~~N.H. Const. Pt. I, Art. 2-b.] Article 2-b~~ ==Constitution== protects the right "to live free from governmental intrusion in private or personal information." (§7.2) **Finding 10. Whoever holds the keys controls the token.** Freeze, recall, and administrative functions protect consumers but are single points of failure (§3.1, §7.4). ~~[Outside the record: the~~ ==The== March 2026 Resolv USR failure, caused by a compromised minting key, illustrates the ~~risk.]~~ ==risk (§7.4).== **Finding 11. Tokenized real-world assets fit existing law, and New Hampshire can be a home for them.** The examples tokenize legal claims that existing law governs; the one statutory barrier found is the real estate transfer tax on each token transfer (Whitlock, February 10). Other jurisdictions have acted to attract issuers (Plume, October 15, 2025), and New Hampshire has UCC Article 12. Tools to verify that a token is backed by what it claims, such as on-chain ~~proof of reserves~~ ==proof-of-reserves== and minting limits, exist and are in use (Chainlink, April 6; Lynq, May 13), but a proof is only as good as its data source, and no state or model law yet sets a standard for tokenized real-world assets. (§4.3, §8.3) **Finding 13. New Hampshire has foundations to build on: blockchain statutes, a trust industry, and UNH talent.** It has a DAO law, ==authority for== a blockchain docket, self-custody protections, a money transmitter exemption, UCC Article 12, a financial privacy statute, a trust industry, and university talent, including UNH's Interoperability ~~Lab; none makes it a leader on its own~~ ==Lab== (§2.6, §8.1). **Finding 14. Some questions were not answered.** The Commission received no briefing on algorithmic stablecoins (flagged January 14 and February 10), the deferred SoFi presentation (April 6, May 4), or Chainlink's follow-up on oracle liability (April 6), and took no evidence on markets in tokenized securities ~~(§2.5)~~ ==(§2.5).== Liability for smart-contract and AI-written code failures is unsettled (§7.1, §11.3). **Finding 15. Network effects reward scale and connection.** A payment ~~token~~ ==network== ~~is worth~~ ==becomes== more ~~the~~ ==useful as== more ~~widely~~ ==people== ~~it~~ ==and== ~~is~~ ==businesses== ~~accepted;~~ ==accept it;== a small state can gain scale through shared bank networks (September 17) and interoperability across issuers and states (BitGo, March 10; LayerZero, April 6). A consortium of states could create significant network effects (§4.5). ## 11.1 What is at stake **Changed:** - **Community banks and the Banking Department.** "We can't lend if we don't have deposits," Healey quoted Andrew Silsby of Kennebec Savings Bank as saying (September 17). Deposit loss would also shrink the assessments that fund examination, a question the Department called "real and unresolved" (May 13); on October 15 it said the greater effect would fall on consumers, through fewer state-chartered ~~banks~~ ==banks.== The deposit-flight figures come from interested parties, but no presenter disputed the direction of the risk (§4.4). - **Prosperity and the trust industry.** Finance is moving onto digital rails, and New Hampshire's trust companies already serve national firms (Healey, September 17). - **Consumers.** Retail holders cannot redeem at par with the issuer and rely on secondary markets that can fail under stress (Hahr, BitGo, March 10). - **Privacy.** Every blockchain transaction leaves a permanent, traceable record (Elliptic, August ~~19, reconstructed minutes).~~ ==19).== ## 11.2 The structural conflict **Changed:** The bridge is the handoff design in bank-led networks such as ~~Roughrider~~ ==Hazel== and ~~Hazel~~ ==Fiserv's multi-bank tokenized deposit== (§5.2): inside the network a token is a tokenized deposit, and when value leaves, the system "burns the tokenized deposit, and issues a stablecoin, in real time and without swaps" (Healey, September 17). That is why §12 accommodates both forms and defers a state-issued token to study rather than rejecting it. In North Dakota, the state-owned Bank of North Dakota leads ==a closed network of== about 92 banks and credit unions, ~~and~~ ==which Healey described as keeping== dollars ~~stay~~ ==on== ~~as deposits~~ ==deposit== at participating institutions ~~(Healey, September~~ ==(September== 17). New Hampshire has no state bank, and the Chair has said one is not practical ~~(§12.5).~~ ==(§12.6).== Here the banks lead, through the BankChain Alliance or a network they form; the State clears the way and has no role in a network's governance, membership, or choice of vendor (Recommendation 4). The honest trade-off: a licensed private issuer also draws dollars from bank deposits, and a state license may lend legitimacy, so a framework may modestly increase stablecoin use. The Commission accepts that: residents already buy stablecoins supervised elsewhere, and ==Banking Department licensees handled== about $1 billion ~~left New Hampshire for~~ ==in== crypto ~~assets~~ ==money== ~~generally~~ ==transmission== in one quarter ==of 2024== (Moranti, January ~~14).~~ ==14; clarified October 15).== Supervised issuance under New Hampshire's rules is better than unsupervised use of out-of-state tokens, and Recommendation 4's deposit monitoring will test that judgment. ## 11.3 Answering the skeptical case **Changed:** 1. **Blockchain: records and chains.** A state cannot govern a public network's consensus, but it can govern the issuers it licenses; Wyoming screened chains against about 30 criteria and reviews them quarterly (October 15, 2025). *Where the case is weak:* base-layer governance stays outside state reach. 2. **Smart contracts: conditions and liability.** Controls exist: audited contracts (Main, May 13), issuance blocked if any control fails (Healey, September 17), and IT and third-party risk examination (Shrago, March 10). *Where the case is unproven:* oracle liability, which Chainlink referred to its lawyers (April 6), and AI-written code; both go to study (Recommendation 13). 3. **Stablecoins: freezes, seigniorage, community banks.** The freeze capability is a federal requirement the state cannot remove, and the "lawful order" it answers is a federal order only (Circle, August ~~19) [Outside the record:~~ ==19;== GENIUS Act section ~~2(16)].~~ ==2(16)).== A state freeze needs state process, on the showing Recommendation 9 sets; Recommendation 3 sets issuers' rules. Issuers may not pay yield, so reserve income goes to the issuer unless the issuer is public, as in Wyoming (Recommendation 13). Recommendation 4 addresses community banks. Dollarization abroad is beyond state reach. 4. **Programmable money: conditionality, expiration, geofencing.** These capabilities exist (§6), and freeze controls belong to particular contracts, not blockchains. Recommendation 9 bars state agencies from attaching expiration dates or location limits to residents' money and guarantees a non-token way to deal with the state. 5. **Real-world assets: not every asset reduces to digital fields.** Agreed. The RWAs in the record tokenize legal claims (LLC equity, fund shares) under existing securities law (Whitlock, February 10). The Commission proposes no new RWA licensing statute ~~(§12.6);~~ ==(§12.7);== Recommendation 8 removes the transfer tax barrier (§12.2). 6. **Tokens: custody and title.** New Hampshire already protects self-custody (RSA ~~359-V:2) [Outside the record: HB 639 (2026), Ch. 286],~~ ==359-V:2),== and Recommendation 2's disclosures cover custody. *Where the case is weak:* that investors hold claims rather than title is a feature of national securities markets a state cannot resolve. Her ==requests about== process ~~requests~~ (an open record, no "Wall Street timeline," a citizen opt-out; May 4) are met by an open process, phased recommendations, and Recommendation 9. ## 11.4 Net assessment **Changed:** New Hampshire should act, not because the benefits are proven but because federal law rewards states that build a certifiable regime. Doing nothing leaves the deposit risk in place and residents using stablecoins supervised ~~elsewhere,~~ ==by other jurisdictions,== which tokenized deposits alone cannot change ~~(§12.5).~~ ==(§12.6).== The case is weakest on government use of programmable money, smart-contract liability, a state token's revenue, and whether issuers will choose a New Hampshire charter (§12.1): the Commission recommends restraint and study on the first three, and features that draw issuers on the last. ## 12. Recommendations **Added:** ==*Answers RSA 383:26, I and IV. Each recommendation below ends with a numbered motion proposed for Commission vote, with possible alternatives; Motion 1 corresponds to Recommendation 1, and so on through Motion 13. Committees are listed only as possibilities; referral is for the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate.*== **Deleted:** ~~*Answers RSA 383:26, I and IV. Each recommendation below ends with a callout stating the motion proposed for Commission vote and possible alternatives.*~~ **Changed:** The recommendations aim where the record shows New Hampshire can lead. They form ~~three~~ ==four== bills for the 2027 session and a plan for the work after; drafting detail is in Appendix ~~K.~~ ==J, and Figure 12 shows the timeline.== | No. | Recommendation | Vehicle | Responsible actor | |---|---|---|---| | 1 | Certifiable issuer framework | Bill A | General Court; Banking Department | | 2 | Protections beyond the federal floor | Bill A | General Court; Banking Department | | 3 | Clear rules for monitoring, freezing, and reversing tokens | Bill A | General Court; Banking Department | | 4 | Tokenized deposits | Bill A | General Court; Banking Department | | 5 | A safe harbor and binding answers for builders | Bill A | General Court; Banking Department; Bureau of Securities Regulation | | 6 | An independent Office of Financial Innovation | Bill ~~A~~ ==D== | General Court | | 7 | Supervisory structure and federal partnerships | Bill A | General Court; Banking Department; Bureau of Securities Regulation | | 8 | A home for tokenized real-world assets | Bill B | General Court; Department of Revenue Administration; Bureau of Securities Regulation | | 9 | Privacy in digital money, and limits on a retail CBDC | Bill C | General Court | | 10 | One body to carry the work forward | LSR 2027-0239 or session law | General Court | | 11 | Federal engagement and interstate cooperation | Agency action | Banking Department; Bureau of Securities Regulation | | 12 | Blockchain-based trusts: redraft for the 2028 session | Legislation, after review | Body under No. 10; Attorney General; trust bar | | 13 | Further study | Session law or the body under No. 10 | Body under No. 10; State Treasury; Office of Financial Innovation | ## 12.1 Bill A: certification and consumer trust **Changed:** ~~*Committees:~~ ==*Possible committees:== House Commerce and Consumer Affairs; Senate Commerce. ==Passing== Bill A ~~must pass~~ in 2027 ~~for~~ ==is== ~~New~~ ==preferable;== ~~Hampshire~~ ==a== ~~to~~ ==conditional== ~~certify~~ ==certification== ~~on~~ ==by== ~~time.*~~ ==January 18, 2028 meets the federal deadline (§4.1).*== - **On time.** Effective on passage, with interim rules adopting the federal standards by reference, so the Department can file a conditional certification as soon as Treasury accepts filings and a complete one once its rules are adopted (§4.1). The 2027 session is ~~the only one that works.~~ ==preferable.== - **Nationwide reach.** Authorize the cooperative agreements that let a New Hampshire licensee operate in other states without their licenses, and keep an issuer that grows past $10 billion chartered in New Hampshire under joint supervision (§4.1). - **Trust companies eligible.** A New Hampshire trust company that is not FDIC-insured, or a limited-purpose trust company subsidiary, may apply (drafting detail in Appendix ~~K).~~ ==J).== - **Fast, funded licensing.** A decision on a substantially complete application within ~~90~~ ==120== days, ==matching the federal clock,== with approval deemed if none is made; ~~published, capped fees;~~ and ~~fees that cover~~ licensing and ~~examination,~~ ==examination== ~~with~~ ==fees== ~~a~~ ==set== ~~start-up appropriation, repaid from fees, only if~~ ==by== the ~~Department~~ ==Banking== ~~finds~~ ==Department,== ~~it~~ ==which== ~~needs~~ ==would== ~~examiners~~ ==be== ~~beyond~~ ==expected== ~~existing~~ ==to== ~~staff;~~ ==cover costs (Moranti, October 15), with== no bank assessment money ~~(Department, May 13 and October 15; Shrago, March 10; drafting~~ ==(drafting== detail in Appendix ~~K).~~ ==J).== ~~The~~ ==Recommendation== ~~framework~~ ==1== ~~and~~ ==should be carried in== LSR 2027-0200 ~~(§3.4)~~ ==(§3.4),== ~~should~~ ==the== ~~be~~ ==stablecoin== ~~merged~~ ==licensing== ~~into~~ ==framework== ~~one~~ ==already== ~~bill.~~ ==filed for 2027.== *Rationale:* certification is the only lever GENIUS gives states, and with no issuer telling the Commission it would seek a New Hampshire charter and Fiserv viewing an OCC-chartered bank as currently best suited to issue (Healey, September 17), these features are what would draw issuers. > [!question] ~~Proposed~~ ==Motion 1 (Recommendation 1), proposed== for Commission vote > Enact a Banking Department issuer framework designed for certification on ~~time, open to New Hampshire trust companies, with fast, funded licensing.~~ ==time.== Do not create a state-issued token now; study it instead (Recommendation 13). > *Possible alternatives:* Wyoming-style state issuance now; virtual-currency licensing (New York model); special purpose depository institution model; relying on tokenized deposits alone ~~(§12.5).~~ ==(§12.6).== > ==*Banking Department position:* the Department proposed the 120-day period and the fee approach, and asked that the motion not restate features already in its proposal.== - **Redemption for every holder.** Any holder, not only large institutions, may redeem at par within a fixed period, with fees capped and minimums limited (Finding 8; BitGo, March 10). - **Reserve safety.** Limit the share of reserves held at any single bank, require public reserve reports at least monthly, and require each issuer to keep a resolution plan (drafting detail in Appendix ~~K).~~ ==J).== - **Plain disclosure.** Label products sold to residents as "stablecoins" by type (§3.1), with point-of-sale disclosures on reserves, attestation frequency, custody of reserves and keys, the absence of FDIC insurance, and secondary-market redemption risk (Hahr and Oranburg, March 10). The Department should pursue a uniform label through CSBS. The duty falls on issuers and platforms selling to residents, not on non-custodial software (drafting detail in Appendix ~~K).~~ ==J).== - **A compliance mark.** Let a stablecoin that is GENIUS-compliant and meets New Hampshire's standards display a mark, such as a check, so consumers can tell it apart from tokens that do not (Oranburg, March 10; members, October 15). - **Who may sell to residents.** Bar digital asset service providers serving New Hampshire residents from offering a payment stablecoin unless it is issued by a state-licensed, federally licensed, or registered foreign issuer, using the GENIUS term "digital asset service provider" (Scott, Circle, October 15; §4.1). - **A privacy floor.** Issuers collect no customer data beyond what federal law requires, may not sell or make secondary use of transaction data, and must publish their data practices. ~~[Outside the record: federal~~ ==Federal== financial privacy law permits states to give consumers greater protection (15 U.S.C. ~~6807).]~~ ==6807).== > [!question] ~~Proposed~~ ==Motion 2 (Recommendation 2), proposed== for Commission vote > Require New Hampshire issuers to exceed the federal floor: par redemption for every holder with capped fees, limits on reserve concentration with monthly public reserve reports and a resolution plan, plain point-of-sale disclosure with a compliance mark, a limit on which stablecoins service providers may offer residents, and a privacy floor. > *Possible alternatives:* adopt the federal standards only; require par redemption only above a minimum amount; drop the privacy floor and rely on federal financial privacy law; omit the compliance mark. - **Legal basis.** Each action needs one: a state warrant or court order for any action taken at the State's request (Recommendation 9); a lawful federal order; the issuer's federal anti-money-laundering and sanctions duties; or a narrow, published policy for correcting errors and recovering stolen or wrongly minted tokens (drafting detail in Appendix ~~K).~~ ==J).== - **Due process.** The holder gets notice, a prompt way to contest the action and have it lifted, and time limits on temporary holds, except where federal law forbids disclosure or governs release (drafting detail in Appendix ~~K).~~ ==J).== - **Transparency.** Each issuer and the Banking Department report yearly, in aggregate, how many actions were taken and on what grounds, and issuers publish their terms in plain language before a person buys or receives a token. - **Safe harbor.** An issuer that follows these rules is not liable to holders under state law for the action. - **Supervision preserved.** Nothing in these rules limits the Banking Commissioner's examination, enforcement, or receivership authority. > [!question] ~~Proposed~~ ==Motion 3 (Recommendation 3), proposed== for Commission vote > Put statutory rules for monitoring, freezing, seizing, and recalling tokens in Bill A, with the legal bases, due process, transparency, safe harbor, and supervisory carve-outs above. > *Possible alternatives:* leave these actions to each issuer's terms of service, subject to federal law; allow state-requested actions on administrative process without a court order. **Deleted:** > [!question] ~~Proposed for Commission vote~~ > ~~Define tokenized deposits as deposits by statute, direct Banking Department guidance and quarterly deposit reporting, and give the State no role in a bank network's governance, membership, or vendor choice.~~ > ~~*Possible alternatives:* rely on existing banking law and FDIC guidance without a statutory definition; give the State a governance role in a bank-led network.~~ **Changed:** **Recommendation 4. Tokenized deposits.** ~~The~~ ==No== ~~statute~~ ==new== ~~should~~ ==statutory== ~~define~~ ==definition== ~~"tokenized~~ ==is== ~~deposit" and confirm that~~ ==needed:== a New Hampshire bank's tokenized deposit is a deposit under ==the== existing ~~law,~~ ==definition (RSA 383-A:2-201(a)(18)), which follows== the ~~FDIC~~ ==FDIC's, and the FDIC's== position as reported ==is that "a deposit is a deposit"== (Main, May 13). The Banking Department should ~~issue~~ ==confirm this in== guidance for state-chartered banks that issue tokenized deposits or join shared networks such as the BankChain Alliance, of which the New Hampshire Bankers Association is a member (Merrill, September 17) (drafting detail in Appendix ~~K).~~ ==J).== State agencies may use bank-led networks for state payments where that saves money; the State should have no role in a network's governance, membership, or choice of vendor. The Department should report deposit trends quarterly, with a voluntary supplement from banks on outflows to stablecoin platforms, to test the estimates in §4.4. *Rationale:* community banks carry the deposit-flight risk (§4.4), and shared bank-led networks let them compete at scale (§4.5, §5.2, §11.2). **Added:** > [!question] ==Motion 4 (Recommendation 4), proposed for Commission vote== > ==Rely on the existing definition of deposit, direct Banking Department guidance confirming that tokenized deposits are deposits, and quarterly deposit reporting, and give the State no role in a bank network's governance, membership, or vendor choice.== > ==*Possible alternatives:* define "tokenized deposit" by statute; give the State a governance role in a bank-led network.== > ==*Banking Department position:* the Department opposes any statutory change to the definition of deposit that is out of alignment with the FDIC. New Hampshire defines "deposit" by reference to the federal definition (RSA 383-A:2-201(a)(18)), and the FDIC has proposed that a tokenized product meeting the federal definition is a deposit, insured like any other, with technology not a factor (FDIC notice of proposed rulemaking, approved April 7, 2026, 91 FR 18534, April 10, 2026; not yet final). At the Department's request, the statutory element has been removed.== **Changed:** - **Safe harbor.** No person should be treated as an issuer, money transmitter, or custodian under the new chapter or RSA 399-G solely for developing, publishing, or maintaining ~~software; operating a node~~ ==software,== or ~~validator; or~~ ==for== providing an interface through which users direct their own digital assets, if the person cannot move a user's assets on its ~~own.~~ ==own; and no person should be treated as an issuer or custodian under the new chapter solely for operating a node or validator. RSA 359-V:3, III already exempts node operation from money transmitter licensing under RSA 399-G, so the safe harbor extends that protection to the new chapter rather than repeating it.== - **The existing exemption.** The new chapter should not narrow RSA 399-G:3, VII, which exempts transfers of convertible virtual currency from money transmitter licensing (§8.1) (drafting detail in Appendix ~~K).~~ ==J).== - **Binding answers.** The Banking Department and the Bureau of Securities Regulation should answer a complete request for a no-action or interpretive letter within 60 days. - **A sandbox.** The General Court should revisit a regulatory sandbox for activities outside the issuer chapter, such as tokenized-asset pilots, agent payments, and deposit-token networks. > [!question] ~~Proposed~~ ==Motion 5 (Recommendation 5), proposed== for Commission vote > Enact the builder safe harbor, preserve RSA 399-G:3, VII, require 60-day answers to no-action and interpretive requests, and revisit a regulatory sandbox. > *Possible alternatives:* rely on case-by-case guidance without a statutory safe harbor; omit the 60-day deadline; defer the sandbox to further ==study; narrow the RSA 399-G:3, VII exemption by transaction volume, or refer the exemption to== study. > ==*Banking Department position:* preserving the exemption conflicts with the Department's discussions with the Chair about a proposal to narrow it based on transaction volume.== **Deleted:** ~~**Recommendation 6. An independent Office of Financial Innovation.** The General Court should establish a small Office of Financial Innovation as an independent agency, administratively attached to the Department of Administrative Services, led by a director appointed by the Governor and Council and advised by a board (drafting detail in Appendix K). The Office would be the state's front door for digital finance: contact point for firms, coordinator of the agencies in the field, adviser to the Governor and the Legislature, staff to the body under Recommendation 10, and intake point for the requests in Recommendation 5. It would have no licensing or supervisory power. A modest appropriation, later supplemented by fees, would fund it; no bank assessment money would. The model is the Office of Energy Innovation. *Rationale:* digital finance touches at least five state agencies, two of them absent from the Commission's membership (Moranti, December 10, 2025), and an independent office keeps the state's promoter and its supervisors separate.~~ > [!question] ~~Proposed for Commission vote~~ > ~~Establish an independent Office of Financial Innovation, administratively attached to the Department of Administrative Services, advisory and coordinating only.~~ > ~~*Possible alternatives:* place the office in the Banking Department, the Department of Business and Economic Affairs, or the State Treasury; rely on the body under Recommendation 10 alone; create no office; enact the Office as a separate bill rather than in Bill A (October 15).~~ **Changed:** **Recommendation 7. Supervisory structure and federal partnerships.** Bill A should name the Banking Department as the State payment stablecoin regulator and authorize the federal relationships certification needs: Federal Reserve Board examination participation and information sharing; joint supervision above $10 billion; arrangements letting New Hampshire trust companies hold reserves and private keys for issuers chartered anywhere; cooperative agreements with other states; and contract examiners and CSBS networked supervision (drafting detail in Appendix ~~K).~~ ==J).== The Bureau of Securities Regulation keeps tokenized securities under RSA 421-B; for federally registered funds, such as tokenized money market fund shares, its role is notice filings and antifraud enforcement. A memorandum of understanding between the two agencies should give each licensee a single lead examiner. Crypto-backed securities and tokenized securities are not for the Banking Department (members, October 15). *Rationale:* the Chair posed the supervisory question (May 4), and GENIUS draws the same line, treating payment stablecoins as neither securities nor commodities (Circle, August 19). > [!question] ~~Proposed~~ ==Motion 7 (Recommendation 7), proposed== for Commission vote > Banking Department as the State payment stablecoin regulator; Bureau of Securities Regulation for tokenized securities; a memorandum of understanding between them; the federal agreements above. > *Possible alternatives:* Banking Department alone; Bureau of Securities Regulation alone; a new digital asset authority (Wyoming's direction, October 15, 2025). ## 12.2 Bill B: tokenized real-world assets **Changed:** ~~*Committees:~~ ==*Possible committees:== House Ways and Means and Commerce and Consumer Affairs; Senate Ways and Means and Commerce.* - **Transfer tax.** Amend RSA 78-B so that an interest in a real estate holding company is taxed only when a person, or a group acting together, acquires a controlling interest, at a threshold the Department of Revenue Administration recommends with a revenue estimate (Whitlock proposed more than 25%, February ~~10).~~ ==10); DRA's revenue data is in §4.3.== - **On-chain registers.** Provide that an entity's records may be kept on a blockchain, that an entry on a ledger the entity designates as its official register counts as registration and delivery under UCC Article 8, and that an LLC may elect Article 8 treatment for interests so registered (drafting detail in Appendix ~~K).~~ ==J).== Plume recommended recognizing ledger-based shares (October 15, 2025). ==This applies only to an entity's own ownership records, at the entity's election; it does not reach public land records, such as registries of deeds, or any person's bank account.== - **Securities guidance.** The Bureau of Securities Regulation should publish guidance confirming that RSA 421-B applies to tokenized securities as it does to securities recorded on paper, covering small and intrastate offerings for New Hampshire real estate tokens (drafting detail in Appendix ~~K).~~ ==J).== - **A safe harbor for verifiable tokens.** Create a voluntary standard. A tokenized real-world asset offered to New Hampshire residents or issued by a New Hampshire entity that meets it, and is not registered with the SEC, would be presumed to give adequate disclosure of its backing under RSA 421-B, and could say that it meets the New Hampshire standard. Issuers that do not opt in remain fully subject to existing law. The standard has six parts (drafting detail in Appendix ~~K):~~ ==J):== (1) a defined legal link, stating what the holder owns and how it is enforced, with the asset held in a segregated, bankruptcy-remote entity (Plume, October 15, 2025); (2) for tokens backed by liquid assets, daily reconciliation, a public on-chain ~~proof of reserves~~ ==proof-of-reserves== fed by the custodian or fund administrator rather than the issuer, and minting limited to verified holdings (Chainlink, April 6); (3) a monthly independent accountant's examination of the backing, and annual audited or reviewed financial statements above a size threshold; (4) an independent smart-contract audit before launch and after any upgrade, with disclosure of every administrative key, upgrade path, and freeze power and who holds it (§7.4); (5) for illiquid assets such as real estate, disclosure of valuation method, frequency, data sources, and fallback, and of title and lien status; and (6) a requirement that any tokenized asset the State Treasury, the Business Finance Authority, or a state fund holds or accepts meet parts 1 to 4. *Rationale:* the transfer tax is the record's one concrete statutory barrier to tokenized real-world assets (§4.3), since a token's compliance check can allow or deny a transfer but cannot collect a tax (Whitlock, February 10). The safe harbor answers the other question buyers will ask, whether a token is backed by what it claims (§8.3). A voluntary standard rewards issuers who prove their backing without creating a licensing regime the record does not support ~~(§12.6),~~ ==(§12.7),== and lets New Hampshire set the first state benchmark for tokenized real-world assets. > [!question] ~~Proposed~~ ==Motion 8 (Recommendation 8), proposed== for Commission vote > Enact Bill B: a change-of-control test for the real estate transfer tax, recognition of on-chain registers under UCC Article 8 with an LLC opt-in, Bureau of Securities Regulation guidance on tokenized securities, and a voluntary safe harbor for verifiable tokens. > *Possible alternatives:* leave the transfer tax unchanged; identify the transfer tax issue for further study, using Department of Revenue Administration data, rather than propose a threshold now (October 15); exempt token transfers from the transfer tax entirely; rely on existing corporate records law without an Article 8 opt-in; make the ~~proof-of-reserve~~ ==proof-of-reserves== and attestation parts mandatory for tokens sold to retail buyers as backed by liquid assets; or omit the safe harbor. ## 12.3 Bill C: privacy in digital money **Changed:** ~~*Committees:~~ ==*Possible committees:== House and Senate Judiciary. Bill C stands apart from Bill A so that debate over law enforcement access cannot delay certification.* - **Coverage.** Extend RSA 359-C to stablecoin issuers, digital asset custodians, exchanges, and money transmitters holding residents' transaction records, ==to the extent they are not already covered as financial institutions,== so tokenized deposits and stablecoins are protected alike. - **The showing.** Require a search warrant or court order before a state agency obtains a person's transaction records from any of them, or buys the same data from an analytics firm or data broker. Keep RSA 359-C's existing exceptions and add consent and emergencies, with an order sought promptly afterward (drafting detail in Appendix ~~K).~~ ==J).== - **State freezes.** A New Hampshire agency may freeze or seize a token only through state legal process, such as a warrant, attachment, or forfeiture. The GENIUS freeze mandate answers only federal orders (§11.3). - **Remedies and reporting.** Provide suppression of evidence obtained in violation, damages and fees, and an annual report from every state agency on requests, orders, and freezes. - **CBDC.** No state agency may issue, promote, pilot, or require use of a retail central bank digital currency, or condition a payment or service on its use (definition in Appendix ~~K).~~ ==J).== This does not bar acceptance, which would conflict with payment choice. - **Payment choice.** Where a state agency accepts or pays in tokens, residents must have a non-token alternative; none may be required to hold a digital wallet or digital ID to receive a state payment or service; and state payments may not carry expiration dates or location limits beyond existing program law. > [!question] ~~Proposed~~ ==Motion 9 (Recommendation 9), proposed== for Commission vote > Adopt Bill C on the base of RSA 359-C, with a warrant or court-order standard and the exceptions listed. > *Possible alternatives:* keep "legal process," which includes administrative subpoenas, as the standard; write a separate digital-money privacy chapter; make no CBDC provision. ## 12.4 Bill D: Office of Financial Innovation *(new section)* **Added:** ==*Possible committees: to be determined. The Office is proposed as its own bill so that it does not ride on the certification bill; LSR 2027-0200 does not include it.*== ==**Recommendation 6. An independent Office of Financial Innovation.** The General Court should establish a small Office of Financial Innovation as an independent agency, administratively attached to the Department of Administrative Services, led by a director appointed by the Governor and Council and advised by a board (drafting detail in Appendix J). The Office would be the state's single point of contact for digital finance: the first stop for firms, coordinator of the agencies in the field, adviser to the Governor and the Legislature, staff to the body under Recommendation 10, and intake point for the requests in Recommendation 5. It would have no licensing or supervisory power. A modest appropriation, later supplemented by fees, would fund it; no bank assessment money would. The model is the Office of Energy Innovation. *Rationale:* digital finance touches at least five state agencies, two of them absent from the Commission's membership (Moranti, December 10, 2025), and an independent office keeps the state's promoter and its supervisors separate.== > [!question] ==Motion 6 (Recommendation 6), proposed for Commission vote== > ==Establish an independent Office of Financial Innovation, administratively attached to the Department of Administrative Services, advisory and coordinating only.== > ==*Possible alternatives:* place the office in the Banking Department, the Department of Business and Economic Affairs, or the State Treasury; carry the Office in Bill A rather than a separate bill; rely on the body under Recommendation 10 alone; create no office.== ## 12.5 Continuing work and agency action **Changed heading:** ~~12.4~~ ==12.5== Continuing work and agency action **Changed:** > [!question] ~~Proposed~~ ==Motion 10 (Recommendation 10), proposed== for Commission vote > Ask that the task force proposed in LSR 2027-0239 carry this agenda, or establish a successor body if it does not advance. > *Possible alternatives:* a separate successor body regardless of LSR 2027-0239; no successor. **Deleted:** - ~~**A state bank.** Not practical, said the Chair, and unnecessary for a Roughrider-style network (Healey, September 17).~~ - ~~**The trusts draft as written** (§9; Recommendation 12).~~ **Changed:** **Recommendation 11. Federal engagement and interstate cooperation.** The Banking Department and the Bureau of Securities Regulation should consider commenting on Treasury's certification rule by November 30, 2026 ~~[Outside the record: 91~~ ==(91== FR ~~61688]~~ ==61688)== and in other federal rulemakings, and ~~the Commission's website and this report~~ should ~~point~~ ==tell== the public ~~to~~ where federal comment periods are announced, since anyone may comment directly (October ~~15),~~ ==15): proposed federal rules and their comment deadlines are published in the Federal Register (federalregister.gov), and most can be commented on at regulations.gov. They should also== ask Treasury to confirm that Recommendation 9 does not count against substantial similarity, seek a pre-filing consultation, and track SEC and CFTC rulemaking and the CLARITY Act (September 17 action item). The Banking Department should explore shared examination and token interoperability with CSBS and New England regulators. If states form a consortium, for example through interstate compacts, it could create significant network effects (§4.5); New Hampshire should monitor it and may want to be an early participant, after study and due diligence. *Rationale:* Wyoming plans interstate compacts (October 15, 2025), and Lynq's advice was "don't go it alone" (May 13). > [!question] ~~Proposed~~ ==Motion 11 (Recommendation 11), proposed== for Commission vote > Consider commenting on Treasury's rule by November 30, 2026 and later federal rulemakings, with public notice of comment periods; explore interstate arrangements with CSBS and New England states; monitor any state consortium or compact and join early if study and due diligence support it; no compact legislation now. > *Possible alternatives:* propose a compact now; take no position. **Recommendation 12. Blockchain-based trusts: redraft for introduction no later than the 2028 session.** The Commission endorses Ian Huyett's concept (November 12, 2025); he noted that no other state's commission had taken up the subject (§9.1). The body under Recommendation 10 should oversee a redraft amending RSA 564-B:5-505A, with Attorney General and trust bar review, resolving the points in Appendix ~~I.~~ ==H.== > [!question] ~~Proposed~~ ==Motion 12 (Recommendation 12), proposed== for Commission vote > Endorse in concept; redraft in RSA 564-B with Attorney General and trust bar review, for introduction no later than the 2028 session. > *Possible alternatives:* endorse the draft for introduction as written; refer for study without endorsement. **Recommendation 13. Further study.** The body under Recommendation 10 should take up (drafting detail in Appendix ~~K):~~ ==J):== - **A state token.** The State Treasury, with the Banking Department and the Department of Revenue Administration, should study a Wyoming-style token (§11.2). - **A tokenized municipal bond pilot,** in two phases, led by the New Hampshire Municipal Bond Bank and the State Treasurer (Plume, October 15, 2025; Whitlock, February 10). - **A special purpose vehicle framework** for holding the asset behind a token in a segregated, bankruptcy-remote entity (Plume, October 15, 2025). - **Tokenized money market fund shares** for state cash management, including the Public Deposit Investment ~~Pool (Galdieri, January 14).~~ ==Pool.== - **Open questions:** liability for oracle, smart-contract, and AI-written code failures (April 6; May 4); agent transactions; algorithmic stablecoins (January 14; February 10); ~~and~~ business tax treatment of stablecoins and reserve income (March 10); tokens that combine payment and asset features (October 15); and markets in tokenized securities, which the Commission did not study ~~(§2.5)~~ ==(§2.5).== > [!question] ~~Proposed~~ ==Motion 13 (Recommendation 13), proposed== for Commission vote > Assign these studies to the body under Recommendation 10, with the lead agencies named above. > *Possible alternatives:* drop the state token study; ==drop the study of tokenized money market fund shares and the Public Deposit Investment Pool, as the Banking Department asks;== begin a tokenized municipal bond pilot now rather than study it; let the questions lapse with RSA 383:26. ## 12.6 Considered and not recommended **Changed heading:** ~~12.5~~ ==12.6== Considered and not recommended **Changed:** - **A state-issued token now.** The structural conflict (§11.2), unproven revenue, and start-up burden argue for study first (Recommendation 13). - **No statute, relying on tokenized deposits alone.** - ==**A state bank.** Not practical, said the Chair, and unnecessary for a Roughrider-style network (Healey, September 17).== - ==**The trusts draft as written** (§9; Recommendation 12).== > [!question] ~~Proposed~~ ==Motion 15 (§12.6), proposed== for Commission vote > Do not adopt the no-statute baseline. Confirm by ~~statute~~ ==guidance== that bank tokenized deposits are deposits ==under existing law== (Recommendation 4), but enact Recommendation 1. Relying only on tokenized deposits would let the January 18, 2028 certification window pass, leaving issuers no New Hampshire option and residents' stablecoins under other jurisdictions' rules. > *Possible alternative:* rely on tokenized deposits under existing law and revisit after 2028. ## 12.7 Statutory elements with no new legislative recommendation **Changed heading:** ~~12.6~~ ==12.7== Statutory elements with no new legislative recommendation **Changed:** - **Environmental protection (I(e)).** No new mechanism is needed. The frameworks recommended here regulate issuers, reserves, and records, not consensus methods; the smart-contract networks used for stablecoins and tokenized assets tend to use consensus mechanisms other than ~~proof of work;~~ ==proof-of-work;== and RSA 359-V:3 already protects node ~~operation, mining,~~ ==operation== and staking ==from prohibition and exempts mining and node operation from money transmitter licensing== (§7.3). - **Tokenized RWAs (I(b), (d)).** No new licensing statute: the RWAs in the record are securities or LLC interests already covered by RSA 421-B and federal law (§8.3); Recommendation 8 removes the one barrier found and offers a voluntary verification standard rather than a license. **Figure revised.** The version 4 figure: ```mermaid --- config: flowchart: nodeSpacing: 25 rankSpacing: 12 wrappingWidth: 340 --- flowchart TD A["By Nov 1, 2026 Report transmitted; RSA 383:26 repealed November 1"] --> B["Nov 30, 2026 Comments due on Treasury certification rule (Rec. 11)"] B --> D["Jan 18, 2027 GENIUS Act effective"] D --> C["2027 session Bill A (Recs. 1 to 5, 7) Bill B (Rec. 8) Bill C (Rec. 9) Bill D (Rec. 6)"] C --> E["2027 Banking Department interim rules; conditional certification filing"] E --> F["By Jan 18, 2028 Federal deadline: a conditional filing meets it; complete filing once rules are adopted"] C --> J["Office of Financial Innovation established (Rec. 6)"] J --> G["Task force or successor body: studies and trusts oversight (Recs. 10, 12, 13)"] G --> H["No later than the 2028 session Trusts redraft introduced (Rec. 12)"] ``` **Changed:** *Figure 12. Recommendations roadmap. Federal ~~dates~~ ==dates:== ~~are~~ ==GENIUS== ~~outside~~ ==Act== ~~the~~ ==section== ~~record~~ ==20== ~~(congress.gov;~~ ==(effective== ~~Chapman~~ ==date)== ~~tracker;~~ ==and== ~~91~~ ==Treasury interim final rule (91== FR ~~61688), except~~ ==61688);== January 18, 2028 ~~(CSBS,~~ ==per== ~~March~~ ==CSBS (March== 10).* ## 13. Conclusion **Changed:** New Hampshire will not be the first state to act on stablecoins, but it can be the state that does it best. The Commission asks the Legislature to enact ~~three~~ ==four== bills in 2027: Bill A, a certifiable issuer framework with protections beyond the federal floor, clear rules for freezes and recalls, tokenized deposits, a safe harbor for builders, ~~an independent Office of Financial Innovation,~~ and a named regulator with the federal partnerships certification needs; Bill B, a home for tokenized real-world assets; ~~and~~ Bill C, privacy in digital ~~money.~~ ==money; and Bill D, an independent Office of Financial Innovation.== It asks both agencies to consider commenting on Treasury's certification rule by November 30, 2026, and the Banking Department to prepare interim rules and a conditional filing before January 18, 2028. And it asks that one body carry the work forward: the trusts redraft for the 2028 session, with the Attorney General and the trust bar, and the studies in Recommendation 13. ## Appendices **Added:** ==*Appendices A to L follow. In the transmitted report, Appendix D reproduces the full glossary; the minutes and other materials in the Commission's record are reproduced in Volume 2 (Appendix E).*== **Changed:** - **A.** Full text of RSA 383:26 - **B.** ~~Summary~~ ==Summaries== of ~~each~~ ==the== ~~presentation,~~ ==presentations,== by meeting date - **C.** Minutes of all meetings, in chronological ~~order. (The header of the December 10, 2025 minutes reads "November 12, 2025" in error.)~~ ==order== - **D.** Glossary of terms - **E.** ~~Public~~ ==Bibliography,== ~~comments~~ ==legal== ~~received~~ ==authorities,== ~~on~~ ==and== ~~drafts~~ ==sources, including all items marked [Outside the record]== - **F.** ~~Bibliography~~ ==Statements== ~~and~~ ==of== ~~sources,~~ ==state== ~~including all items marked [Outside the record]~~ ==departments== - **G.** ~~Statements~~ ==Supplemental statements== of ~~state departments~~ ==members== - **H.** ~~Supplemental~~ ==The== ~~statements~~ ==blockchain-based== ~~of~~ ==trusts== ~~members~~ ==draft and the points a redraft should resolve== - **I.** The ~~blockchain-based~~ ==Commission's== ~~trusts draft and the points a redraft should resolve (below)~~ ==meetings== - **J.** ~~The~~ ==Bill== ~~Commission's~~ ==map== ~~meetings~~ ==and== ~~(below)~~ ==drafting detail== - **K.** ~~Bill~~ ==GENIUS== ~~map~~ ==Act== ~~and drafting~~ ==certification== detail ~~(below)~~ - **L.** ~~GENIUS~~ ==Presenters'== ~~Act certification detail (below)~~ ==interests== - ~~**M.** Presenters' interests (below)~~ ## Appendix A. RSA 383:26 **New in version 4.** The whole appendix is new; read it in [[Draft Final Report v4]]. ## Appendix B. Summaries of the presentations, by meeting date **New in version 4.** The whole appendix is new; read it in [[Draft Final Report v4]]. ## Appendix C. Minutes of the Commission's meetings **New in version 4.** The whole appendix is new; read it in [[Draft Final Report v4]]. ## Appendix D. Glossary of terms **New in version 4.** The whole appendix is new; read it in [[Draft Final Report v4]]. ## Appendix E. Bibliography and sources **New in version 4.** The whole appendix is new; read it in [[Draft Final Report v4]]. ## Appendix F. Statements of state departments **New in version 4.** The whole appendix is new; read it in [[Draft Final Report v4]]. ## Appendix G. Supplemental statements of members **New in version 4.** The whole appendix is new; read it in [[Draft Final Report v4]]. ## Appendix H. The blockchain-based trusts draft *(new section)* ## The draft statutory language **Changed:** The draft implements the first three proposals in §9.2 (jurisdiction, spendthrift protection, and the impossibility presumption). The 2026 Blockchain Basic Laws have since supplied the rest: RSA 359-V:1 defines "decentralized," "blockchain protocol," and "smart contract," and RSA 491:7-c authorizes a ~~docket.~~ ==docket== ~~[Outside~~ ==(2026,== ~~the record: HB 639 (2026), Ch. 286.]~~ ==286).== ## Points for any redraft **Added:** - ==**Numbering.** RSA 359-V:5 is already taken (severability). The draft needs a new section number and arguably belongs in the Trust Code, RSA 564-B (2026, 286:3).== - ==**Citations.** Paragraph III cites "RSA 563-B:5-502" in one place and RSA 564-B elsewhere; the intended citation is likely RSA 564-B:5-502. RSA 545-A was repealed and replaced by RSA 545-B, the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act, effective August 31, 2026 (HB 1127; 2026, 215), so any cross-reference should cite 545-B.== - ==**Paragraph V.** Its second sentence reads: "This section shall not mean that a person may be compelled to provide access to any wallet not described herein." Read literally, that protects wallets *outside* paragraph IV, apparently the opposite of the intended limit. The drafter should confirm the intended rule.== - ==**The "no human back door" premise.** Many smart contracts include admin keys, oracles, upgrade paths, or governance votes that let someone alter outcomes, and the record shows such controls are common in token contracts (§3.1, §7.1). Proof of decentralization alone does not prove the defendant lacks control. Paragraph II should adopt RSA 359-V:1's definition and address these controls expressly.== - ==**Trust elements.** Paragraph III does not address the trustee, beneficiaries, trust property, settlor intent, or governing law.== - ==**Creditor protections.** The draft has no savings clause for bankruptcy, tax liens, forfeiture, or voidable transfers, and does not address RSA 564-B's existing limits on self-settled trusts.== - ==**Existing self-settled trust law.** A redraft should amend RSA 564-B:5-505A, which already protects a settlor's interest under a spendthrift provision, and should address its exception creditors for child support and basic alimony, added effective August 31, 2026 (RSA 564-B:5-505A; 2026, 215).== - ==**Federal limits.** State law cannot bind a bankruptcy court applying 11 U.S.C. 548(e) or a federal court weighing a self-created impossibility defense.== - ==**Balance of the record.** The Commission heard no opposing trust-law analysis and has not received a formal review from the Attorney General's office or the trust bar.== **Deleted:** - ~~**Numbering.** RSA 359-V:5 is already taken (severability). The draft needs a new section number and arguably belongs in the Trust Code, RSA 564-B. [Outside the record: HB 639 (2026), Ch. 286.]~~ - ~~**Citations.** Paragraph III cites "RSA 563-B:5-502" in one place and RSA 564-B elsewhere; the intended citation is likely RSA 564-B:5-502. [Outside the record: HB 1127 (2026)] RSA 545-A was repealed and replaced by RSA 545-B, the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act, effective August 31, 2026, so any cross-reference should cite 545-B.~~ - ~~**Paragraph V.** Its second sentence reads: "This section shall not mean that a person may be compelled to provide access to any wallet not described herein." Read literally, that protects wallets *outside* paragraph IV, apparently the opposite of the intended limit. The drafter should confirm the intended rule.~~ - ~~**The "no human back door" premise.** Many smart contracts include admin keys, oracles, upgrade paths, or governance votes that let someone alter outcomes, and the record shows such controls are common in token contracts (§3.1, §7.1). Proof of decentralization alone does not prove the defendant lacks control. Paragraph II should adopt RSA 359-V:1's definition and address these controls expressly.~~ - ~~**Trust elements.** Paragraph III does not address the trustee, beneficiaries, trust property, settlor intent, or governing law.~~ - ~~**Creditor protections.** The draft has no savings clause for bankruptcy, tax liens, forfeiture, or voidable transfers, and does not address RSA 564-B's existing limits on self-settled trusts.~~ - ~~**Existing self-settled trust law.** A redraft should amend RSA 564-B:5-505A, which already protects a settlor's interest under a spendthrift provision, and should address its exception creditors for child support and basic alimony, added effective August 31, 2026. [Outside the record: RSA 564-B:5-505A; 2026, 215.]~~ - ~~**Federal limits.** State law cannot bind a bankruptcy court applying 11 U.S.C. 548(e) or a federal court weighing a self-created impossibility defense.~~ - ~~**Balance of the record.** The Commission heard no opposing trust-law analysis and has not received a formal review from the Attorney General's office or the trust bar.~~ ## Appendix I. The Commission's meetings **Changed heading:** Appendix ~~J.~~ ==I.== The Commission's meetings **Changed:** | Date | Presenters | Principal topics | |---|---|---| | Sept 17, 2025 | (organizational) | Organization | | Oct 15, 2025 | Global Blockchain Business Council; Wyoming Stable Token Commission; Plume Network | Global landscape; Wyoming's state token; RWA platforms | | Nov 12, 2025 | Prof. Seth Oranburg (UNH Law); Ian Huyett (NH Blockchain Council); The Digital Chamber | GENIUS and CLARITY Acts; blockchain-based trusts; state approaches | | Dec 10, 2025 | Fortris; Hedera Foundation | Enterprise stablecoin use; network selection and governance | | Jan 14, 2026 | Anchorage Digital; Ceres Coin | Institutional adoption; tokenized money market fund share for government use | | Feb 10, 2026 | Digital Asset (Canton Network); Porcupine Properties | Tokenized collateral; tokenized equity in a New Hampshire real estate LLC | | Mar 10, 2026 | Conference of State Bank Supervisors; BitGo | GENIUS rulemaking and state regimes; stablecoin types and markets | | Apr 6, 2026 | Chainlink; LayerZero | Oracles; cross-chain interoperability and Wyoming's FRNT | | May 4, 2026 | Dr. Karen Parker Feld; Chair Keith Ammon | "A solution in search of a problem?"; the Chair's year in review | | May 13, 2026 | Lynq; Vantage Bank (Hazel Network, with Custodia Bank) | Tokenized fund shares as collateral; bank tokenized deposits | | Aug 19, 2026 | Elliptic; Circle; Prof. Oranburg | Blockchain ~~analytics;~~ ==analytics and on-chain risk management;== GENIUS federal and state roles; Senate CLARITY changes | | Sept 17, 2026 | Andy Schwab (member); Chainlink; Fiserv; NH Bankers Association / BankChain Alliance | Live wallet and DeFi demonstration; agentic payments; Roughrider Coin; a bank-owned payments network | | Oct 15, 2026 | (drafting meeting; comments from Circle and the Department of Revenue Administration) | Review of the draft report; approval of the May 13, August 19, and September 17 minutes | | ==Oct 29, 2026== | ==(adoption meeting, State House)== | ==Vote to adopt this report; approval of the October 15 minutes== | *Table ~~J.1.~~ ==I.1.== The Commission's meetings.* ## Appendix J. Bill map and drafting detail **Changed heading:** Appendix ~~K.~~ ==J.== Bill map and drafting detail **Changed:** | Bill | Contents | ==Possible== House committee | ==Possible== Senate committee | Intended funding | Related filings | |---|---|---|---|---|---| | A. Certification and consumer trust | Recommendations 1 to ==5,== 7 | Commerce and Consumer Affairs | Commerce | Issuer ~~fees,~~ ==fees== ~~after~~ ==set== ~~a start-up appropriation for examiners repaid from fees; a modest appropriation for~~ ==by== the ~~Office~~ ==Banking== ~~of Financial Innovation;~~ ==Department;== no bank assessment money | LSR 2027-0200 (Rep. John Hunt), ~~to~~ ==the== ~~be~~ ==vehicle== ~~merged~~ ==for Recommendation 1== | | B. Tokenized real-world assets | Recommendation 8 | Ways and Means; Commerce and Consumer Affairs | Ways and Means; Commerce | Department of Revenue Administration revenue estimate; no new appropriation | None known | | C. Privacy in digital money | Recommendation 9 | Judiciary | Judiciary | Agency reporting within existing budgets | HB 1232 (2024), interim study | | ==D. Office of Financial Innovation== | ==Recommendation 6== | ==To be determined== | ==To be determined== | ==A modest appropriation, later supplemented by fees; no bank assessment money== | ==None known== | | Continuing work | Recommendations 10 to 13 (Recommendation 11 by agency action) | As assigned | As assigned | Within the Office's budget | LSR 2027-0239 (Rep. John Schneller) | ## Drafting detail **Changed:** - **Conditional filing.** ~~[Outside the record:~~ Treasury's interim final rule ~~(91 FR 61688)~~ treats any filing by January 18, 2028 as meeting the deadline, even a conditional one, but begins formal review only when a filing is complete and ~~unconditional.]~~ ==unconditional (91 FR 61688, 61691 to 61692; §4.1).== - **Trust company eligibility.** An eligible trust company's activities should be confined to those GENIUS permits, with holders' claims to reserves ranked ~~first.~~ ==first== ~~[Outside the record: GENIUS~~ ==(GENIUS== Act sections 2(31), 4(a)(7), and ~~11.]~~ ==11).== The state's trust industry has drawn firms from out of state (§8.1). - **Licensing clock.** The ~~90-day~~ ==120-day== decision period ~~is faster than the 120 days~~ ==matches== the federal path ~~allows. [Outside the record: GENIUS~~ ==(GENIUS== Act section ~~5(d).]~~ ==5(d)(1)(A); 12 U.S.C. 5904(d)(1)(A)). The Banking Department proposed this period.== - ~~**Funding.** The start-up appropriation is needed because one or two licensees cannot carry an examination program alone (Department, May 13; Shrago, March 10).~~ - **Reserve safety.** Fully reserved stablecoins can still slip. [Outside the record: USDC fell ~~to about~~ ==below== 87 cents in March 2023 ~~while~~ ==after== ~~part~~ ==Circle disclosed that $3.3 billion== of its reserves ~~was~~ ==were== held at the failed Silicon Valley Bank ~~(CNBC).]~~ ==(CNBC, March 11, 2023).]== - **Disclosure.** Compliance with federal disclosures should count where they cover the same ground. - **Compliance mark.** The Banking Department would set the mark's form and conditions by rule and could revoke it; a uniform mark through CSBS would be preferable to a New Hampshire-only one. - **Service-provider limit.** Track GENIUS Act sections 3 and 8 and federal definitions rather than restating them (§4.1), so the state rule moves with federal rulemaking. - **Legal basis.** The issuer's federal duties include the GENIUS requirement that issuers be able to block, freeze, and reject impermissible ~~transactions.~~ ==transactions== ~~[Outside the record: GENIUS~~ ==(GENIUS== Act sections 2(16) and ~~4(a)(5).]~~ ==4(a)(5)).== - **Due process exceptions.** The federal-law exceptions to notice include suspicious activity reports and sanctions blocks. Where a holder cannot be identified, public posting suffices. - **Safe harbor model.** ~~[Outside the record:~~ Utah ~~HB 230 (2025)~~ exempts node ~~operation~~ ==operation, software development,== and ~~software~~ ==related== ~~development~~ ==activity== from money transmitter ~~licensing.]~~ ==licensing (Utah Code 7-28-104; HB 230, 2025).== - **Existing exemption.** The new chapter should state that it does not narrow RSA 399-G:3, VII, as applied to persons other than issuers. - **Sandbox history.** ~~[Outside the record:~~ HB 1507 (2024), a Banking Department sandbox bill, was sent to interim ~~study.]~~ ==study.== - **Attachment.** ~~[Outside the record:~~ RSA 21-G:10 lets an attached agency exercise its powers "independently of the department," which provides only administrative ~~support.]~~ ==support.== - **Advisory board.** Legislators from both chambers, a New Hampshire banker, an issuer or builder, and a University of New Hampshire representative, with the Banking Commissioner and the Director of the Bureau of Securities Regulation as non-voting members. - **Agencies coordinated.** The Banking Department, the Bureau of Securities Regulation, the Secretary of State's DAO registry, the State Treasury, and the Department of Revenue Administration. The Commission's membership did not include the State Treasury or the Department of Revenue Administration (Moranti, December 10, 2025). - **Model.** The Office of Energy Innovation advises the Governor, agencies, and the Legislature on developing a new ~~industry.~~ ==industry,== ~~[Outside~~ ==clean energy resources in== the ~~record:~~ ==Gulf== ~~RSA~~ ==of== ~~12-P:7-b.]~~ ==Maine (RSA 12-P:7-b, II(b)).== *Recommendation 7 (supervisory structure).* Joint supervision above $10 billion is with the federal regulator; the trust company arrangements rest on information sharing with the Federal Reserve Board; cooperative agreements with other states provide for nationwide ~~operation.~~ ==operation== ~~[Outside the record: GENIUS~~ ==(GENIUS== Act sections 4(c)(3), 4(d), 7, and ~~10(a)(1)(B).]~~ ==10(a)(1)(B)).== - **Transfer tax.** The controlling-interest test should count an acquisition in one transfer or a series of transfers within a set period. - **On-chain registers.** Provide that an entity's records under RSA 293-A and RSA 304-C may be kept on a blockchain; that an entry on a ledger the entity designates as its official register counts as registration of transfer under RSA 382-A, Article 8, Part 4 (RSA 382-A:8-401 et seq.) and as delivery under RSA 382-A:8-301(b); and that an LLC operating agreement may elect Article 8 treatment for interests so registered. New Hampshire already allows uncertificated shares and electronic records ~~[Outside the record: RSA~~ ==(RSA== 293-A:6.26 and ~~16.01];~~ ==16.01);== this step goes further, as Delaware did in 2017 ~~[Outside the record: Delaware~~ ==(Delaware== General Corporation Law sections 219 and ~~224].~~ ==224).== Tokenized shares and LLC interests are governed by Article 8 of the UCC and entity law, not by Article 12, so modernizing ownership records is what lets a token carry the interest it represents. - **Securities guidance.** The guidance should be consistent with the SEC staff's view that a security's format and recordkeeping method do not change how securities law ~~applies.~~ ==applies== ~~[Outside~~ ==(SEC== ~~the~~ ==Divisions== ~~record:~~ ==of== ~~SEC~~ ==Corporation== ~~staff~~ ==Finance,== ~~statement~~ ==Investment Management, and Trading and Markets, Statement== on ~~tokenized~~ ==Tokenized== ~~securities,~~ ==Securities,== January 28, ~~2026.]~~ ==2026).== - **Mandate.** RSA 383:26, I names tokenized real-world assets alongside stable tokens. The pilots in Recommendation 13 build on Bill B. - **Safe harbor for verifiable tokens.** - *Scope and effect.* Applies to tokenized real-world assets offered to New Hampshire residents or issued by New Hampshire entities that are not registered with the SEC. Opting in creates a presumption of adequate disclosure of backing under RSA 421-B; it does not exempt an offering from registration, antifraud, or any other law, and does not apply to payment stablecoins, which Bill A governs. The Bureau of Securities Regulation administers the standard, may adopt rules under RSA 541-A, and may revoke the presumption for noncompliance. - *Liquid-asset tokens* (Treasuries, fund shares, deposits, commodities held in custody): daily reconciliation of tokens to assets; a public on-chain reserve feed sourced from the custodian, fund administrator, or bank; minting blocked beyond verified holdings; a monthly examination by an independent certified public accountant, using criteria such as the AICPA 2025 Criteria for Stablecoin Reporting adapted by rule ~~[Outside the record: AICPA, March 6, 2025];~~ ==(§8.3);== annual audited financial statements above a size threshold set by rule, reviewed statements below it, along the lines of California's revenue-based approach ~~[Outside the record: Cal.~~ ==(Cal.== Fin. Code 3211(b)(1), audited statements above $2 million in California ~~revenue].~~ ==revenue).== - *Illiquid-asset tokens* (real estate, private credit, equipment): valuation by an independent appraiser or administrator at a disclosed frequency, the data sources and fallback if a source fails, and title and lien status at issuance and annually. - *All tokens:* the offering document states whether the holder owns the asset, an interest in an entity that owns it, or a contractual claim, consistent with the SEC staff's categories of ~~issuer-tokenized, custodial,~~ ==issuer-sponsored== and ~~synthetic~~ ==third-party-sponsored (custodial or synthetic) tokenized== securities ~~[Outside~~ ==(Statement== ~~the~~ ==on== ~~record:~~ ==Tokenized== ~~SEC staff statement,~~ ==Securities,== January 28, ~~2026];~~ ==2026);== the asset is held by a segregated, bankruptcy-remote entity; an independent smart-contract audit precedes launch and any upgrade; and every administrative key, upgrade path, oracle dependency, and freeze or seize power is disclosed with its holder. - *Benchmarks.* GENIUS monthly examined reserve reports ~~[Outside the record: 12~~ ==(12== U.S.C. ~~5903(a)(3)];~~ ==5903(a)(1)(C) and (a)(3));== NYDFS 2022 guidance (daily full backing, segregation, attestations); Illinois 205 ILCS 731/5-10 (assets sufficient to cover customer claims, segregation, no lending or pledging, rulemaking on audits); California Fin. Code 3503 (assets sufficient to cover claims, statutory trust in bankruptcy); EU MiCA Article 36 (semiannual reserve audit). No model act covers this ground; UCC Articles 8 and 12 address ownership and control, not verification of backing. - **Data brokers.** ~~[Outside the record:~~ Montana closed the data broker route for government purchases in 2025 (SB ~~282).]~~ ==282).== - **Exceptions.** Keep RSA 359-C's existing exceptions for supervisory agencies and for child support, medical assistance, and adult protective investigations, and state whether investigative demands by the Attorney General and the Bureau of Securities Regulation keep a notice-and-challenge ~~route.~~ ==route== ~~[Outside the record: RSA~~ ==(RSA== 359-C:4 and ~~359-C:11.]~~ ==359-C:11).== - **CBDC definition.** A retail CBDC is a Federal Reserve digital liability available to the public, excluding wholesale settlement, FedNow, tokenized deposits, and stablecoins. ~~[Outside the record:~~ New Hampshire's UCC already excludes government currency in electronic form from the definition of money (RSA 382-A:1-201(b)(24); ==2022, 281;== 2023, 236), and federal law ~~temporarily~~ bars a Federal Reserve retail CBDC through 2030 ~~(P.L. 119-101, Title XI; CRS IF11471).]~~ ==(§7.2).== The provision is durable insurance more than an immediate change. ~~[Outside the record: a~~ ==A== 2024 bill to bar state ~~agencies~~ ==and local governments== from accepting a CBDC ==or joining a Federal Reserve CBDC test== (HB 1232) was sent to interim ~~study.]~~ ==study.== - **Record.** Parker Feld asked how issuer freeze powers differ from a CBDC and asked for a citizen opt-out modeled on Idaho SB 1299, and Schwab spoke for preserving ~~it~~ ==that opt-out== (May 4). - **A state token.** Net yield given Wyoming's 102% reserve requirement and rate sensitivity; start-up and operating cost (October 15, 2025); the deposit effect on New Hampshire banks netted against lost lending and the Banking Department's assessment base (§11.2); and whether a closed bank network could capture the benefit without a state issuer (September 17). Wyoming went first, and the record holds no figures on its adoption or revenue (§8.2); Lynq's advice was "Don't go first" (May 13). - **Municipal bond pilot phases.** First an institutional, permissioned issuance with bond counsel's tax and registration opinions, then retail denominations once disclosure and dealer rules are resolved (Plume, October 15, 2025; Whitlock, February 10). [Outside the record: Quincy, Massachusetts issued ~~about~~ $10 million ~~in~~ ==of== ~~blockchain-based~~ ==tax-exempt== bonds ~~in April 2024~~ ==recorded== on J.P. Morgan's Onyx ==blockchain== platform ==(since renamed Kinexys) in April 2024== (The Bond ~~Buyer).]~~ ==Buyer, April 25, 2024).]== - **Special purpose vehicles.** The framework should hold the asset in a segregated, bankruptcy-remote entity, drawing on Delaware statutory trusts and series LLCs as well as Bermuda's model (Plume, October 15, 2025). - **State cash management.** The State Treasurer operates the Public Deposit Investment Pool ~~(Galdieri, January 14). [Outside the record: RSA~~ ==(RSA== 6:45 to ~~6:47.]~~ ==6:47).== - **Open questions.** A default rule binding a principal to an agent's transactions within a mandate the user sets; algorithmic stablecoins, distinguished from overcollateralized designs (January 14; February 10); and how the business profits and business enterprise taxes treat stablecoins and reserve income, including BitGo's suggestion to treat stablecoins as cash equivalents (March 10). ## Appendix K. GENIUS Act certification detail **Changed heading:** Appendix ~~L.~~ ==K.== GENIUS Act certification detail **Changed:** **Who may issue.** ~~[Outside the record: the~~ ==The== Act lists a subsidiary of an insured depository institution among permitted issuers (GENIUS ~~Act,~~ ==Act== section 2(23)); foreign issuers are covered by section 18 (Figure ~~4).]~~ ==4).== **Nationwide reach and host states.** ~~[Outside the record:~~ ==Under== GENIUS Act sections 4(c)(3), 4(d), and ~~7(f).]~~ ==7(f),== ~~Host~~ ==host== states' licensing laws do not apply to an issuer licensed by a certified state; their other laws apply only as they would to a federally licensed issuer, with the home state's law filling any gap, and their consumer protection laws still apply. **Deleted:** ~~**Where the rules stand.** As of March 10, only the OCC had published its proposal (CSBS). [Outside the record: OCC Bulletin 2026-3, February 25, 2026 (91 FR 10202); Treasury's proposed rule on "substantially similar" state regimes, April 3, 2026 (91 FR 16844), requiring state outcomes "at least as stringent and protective"; FDIC and NCUA proposals, May 18, 2026.]~~ ~~**The CLARITY Act.** The Chair reported that the Senate did not pass it (September 17). [Outside the record: Senate cloture failed on September 15, 2026 (Troutman; DLA Piper); the SEC proposed "Regulation Crypto Assets" on August 18, 2026.]~~ **Changed:** **Deadline, renewal, and expedited review.** ~~[Outside the record:~~ ==Under== GENIUS Act sections 4(c)(4), 4(c)(7), and ~~20.]~~ ==20,== ~~The~~ ==the== state deadline is one year after the Act's effective date, which ~~will be no later than~~ ==is== January 18, 2027. Certification must be renewed every year. Expedited review is reserved for regimes in effect within 180 days of the Act's enactment, which New Hampshire's will not be. ~~[Outside the record: the~~ ==The== Act takes effect on ==the earlier of== January 18, ~~2027,~~ ==2027== or 120 days after ==the primary federal regulators issue== final ~~rules,~~ ==rules== ~~whichever~~ ==(GENIUS Act section 20); since no such rule issued before September 20, 2026, the date== is ~~earlier~~ ==January== ~~(Chapman~~ ==18,== ~~tracker).]~~ ==2027 (91 FR 61691 n.17).== **Who certifies.** CSBS said states submit frameworks to Treasury (March 10); Circle named Treasury, the Federal Reserve, and the FDIC (August 19, reconstructed minutes). ~~[Outside the record:~~ Treasury's interim final rule of September 30, 2026 (91 FR 61688) sets the procedures of the Stablecoin Certification Review Committee, chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury, whose other members are the Chair of the Federal Reserve Board (or the Vice Chair for Supervision) and the Chairman of the ~~FDIC;~~ ==FDIC.== A filing by January 18, 2028 meets the deadline even if conditional or incomplete, but it is formally submitted for review only when it is complete and ~~unconditional.]~~ ==unconditional (91 FR 61691 to 61692).== **Added:** ==**Where the rules stand.** CSBS described the OCC's proposal as the only one published as of March 10, though the FDIC and NCUA had issued earlier proposals. The rulemakings: FDIC proposals of December 19, 2025 (90 FR 59409) and April 10, 2026 (91 FR 18534); NCUA proposals of February 12, 2026 (91 FR 6531) and May 18, 2026 (91 FR 28956); OCC Bulletin 2026-3 and proposal, February 25, 2026 (91 FR 10202, March 2, 2026); Treasury's proposed rule on "substantially similar" state regimes, April 3, 2026 (91 FR 16844), requiring state outcomes "at least as stringent and protective"; Treasury's GENIUS issuance proposal, August 18, 2026 (91 FR 53368); and Federal Reserve Board proposals of September 29, 2026 (91 FR 61346 and 91 FR 61580). The OCC issued its final rule on October 21, 2026 (OCC Bulletin 2026-50; 91 FR 67000, October 23, 2026, effective January 18, 2027), implementing the GENIUS Act's issuer requirements for entities under its jurisdiction.== **Changed:** **The OCC's ~~proposal~~ ==rules== as a signpost.** The OCC proposed 1:1 redemption within two business days, a 20-day average portfolio maturity, $5 million minimum capital, twelve months of operating expenses held as a backstop, and a 12-month examination cycle; CSBS stressed that states keep discretion in meeting "substantially similar" (March 10). ==The final rule keeps the two-business-day redemption standard, drops the proposed automatic seven-day extension when redemption requests spike (91 FR 67065), gives issuers more flexibility in managing reserve assets, and simplifies the capital requirements. The other figures in this paragraph are from the proposal.== **Federal reach into state issuers.** CSBS flagged friction: federal regulators may act against a state issuer in "unusual and exigent circumstances," and the $10 billion threshold is not inflation-adjusted (March 10). ~~[Outside the record:~~ GENIUS Act section 7(e) gives that power to the Federal Reserve Board for any state qualified issuer and to the Comptroller for nonbank state ~~issuers.]~~ ==issuers.== **Waivers above $10 billion.** CSBS suggested Wyoming may have a stronger waiver case because its program predates the Act (March 10). ~~[Outside the record:~~ GENIUS Act section 4(d)(3)(C)(ii) presumes a waiver for issuers from a ~~certified~~ state regime established before the ~~90~~ ==90-day== ~~days~~ ==period== ending on ~~enactment.~~ ==enactment, certified under section 4(c), and with at least one approved issuer, unless the federal regulator rebuts it by clear and convincing evidence.== New Hampshire's would not qualify, so its issuers above $10 billion would rely on the ordinary ~~criteria,~~ ==criteria in section 4(d)(3)(B),== which include the state regulator's ~~experience.]~~ ==experience.== **Yield.** ~~[Outside the record:~~ GENIUS Act section 4(a)(11) bars issuers from paying yield and does not name affiliates or ~~exchanges.]~~ ==exchanges.== **Added:** ==**The CLARITY Act.** The Chair reported that the Senate did not pass it (September 17). Senate cloture on the motion to proceed failed 49 to 50 on September 15, 2026 (Senate Roll Call Vote No. 234, 119th Congress). The SEC proposed "Regulation Crypto Assets" on August 18, 2026 (Release Nos. 33-11434 and 34-106150; 91 FR 54510, August 21, 2026).== ## Appendix L. Presenters' interests **Changed heading:** Appendix ~~M.~~ ==L.== Presenters' interests **Changed:** | Presenter | Interest in the subject | Where the report relies on it | |---|---|---| | Fiserv (Joe Healey) | Sells the Roughrider platform and the FIUSD stablecoin | Bank-led designs; closed bank networks | | Vantage Bank (Shawn Main) | Sells the Hazel tokenized-deposit product | Tokenized deposits; deposit-flight scenario | | Chainlink | Sells data, interoperability, and agent-payment services | ~~Proof of reserve;~~ ==Proof-of-reserves;== agentic payments | | LayerZero | Built Wyoming's FRNT; sells interoperability | Wyoming; cross-chain transfers | | Plume Network | Operates a tokenized-asset network | Tokenized real-world assets; proposals for New Hampshire | | Lynq Network | Operates a tokenized settlement network | Tokenized collateral; advice to states | | Ceres Coin | Proposed its own product for state benefit programs | Tokenized fund shares | | Digital Asset (Canton Network) | Operates the Canton Network | Tokenized collateral; privacy design | | Circle | Issues USDC | GENIUS Act roles | | BitGo, Anchorage Digital, Fortris, ~~Hedera, Elliptic~~ ==Hedera== | Sell ~~custody, network,~~ ==custody== or ~~analytics~~ ==network== services | Token types; custody; ~~privacy; illicit finance~~ ==privacy== | | ==Elliptic== | ==Sells on-chain risk management services== | ==Privacy; illicit finance== | | Porcupine Properties | Plans to sell real estate tokens | Tokenized real estate; transfer tax | | New Hampshire Bankers Association | Represents banks; member of the BankChain Alliance | Deposit flight; BankChain | | Global Blockchain Business Council; The Digital Chamber | Industry associations | Landscape; state approaches | | Ian Huyett | Co-author of the trust proposal; volunteer board member, New Hampshire Blockchain Council | Blockchain-based trusts | *Table ~~M.1.~~ ==L.1.== Presenters' interests. Members' affiliations appear in the front matter.*